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Abstract 
 
There are few concepts in international relations (IR) more pervasive than the theory of 
strong and weak states. The PRC’s lack of exclusive control over the peoples of “autonomous 
regions” like Tibet, the economics of “Special Administrative Regions” like Hong Kong, and the 
domestic space of Taiwan fit all the requirements for being a weak state. At the same time, IR 
scholars and practitioners agree that China is undergoing epochal economic and imperialist 
transformations which signal either a “peaceful rise” or a “new hegemony” as a world 
superpower. This project addresses the gap by applying Deleuze and Guattari’s method of 
assemblage thinking to answer the question: How does China produce, maintain, and hold 
together its multiplicity of territorial arrangements?  
This dissertation traces the historical development of Chinese territorial capacities in 
contrast to the history of Anglo-European territoriality. It begins with an analysis of tianxia or 
“all under heaven” as a territorial strategy developed by the first Chinese empire to centralize 
territorial administration, divide land, and divide the power of elites through academic 
competition. The project then considers China’s paradoxical governance of Hong Kong as an 
autonomous region allowed to manage its own international relationships while simultaneously 
preventing Taiwan’s international independence. Instead of dividing elites through academic 
competition, it finds that the British created collaborative colonial capacities to govern Hong 
Kong by promoting a new gentry class from the Chinese merchants who collaborated against the 
Qing Dynasty during the Opium Wars. The PRC’s initial decision to reclaim Hong Kong for 
China was accidental, but China took Hong Kong to incorporate collaborative colonial capacities 
into its administrative hierarchy of territorial governance. The dissertation ends with a case study 
of the PRC’s deployment of tianxia strategies of centralized administration, capacities of 
collaborative colonialization, and cultural governance to assemble Sansha City on the artificial 
Yongxing Island as a territory of “Greater China” in the South China Sea. This dissertation uses 
assemblage thinking to generate an alternative understanding of the ways China interprets and 
applies territoriality differently than its international counterparts. 
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Introduction 
 
Chinese Territorial Assemblages 
 
 
In our traditional imaginary, the Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most 
rigidly ordered, the one most deaf to temporal events, most attached to the pure 
delineation of space; we think of it as a civilization of dikes and dames beneath 
the eternal face of the sky; we see it, spread and frozen, over the entire surface of 
a continent surrounded by walls. 
     ―Michel Foucault, Preface to The Order of Things1 
 
 
There are few ideas in international relations (IR) more pervasive than the theory of 
strong and weak states, and the term “failed states” has become one of the most popular 
contributions IR has made to public discourse and public policy. Reporters from The New York 
Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian, and other prominent news media continually 
discuss contemporary states in these terms. Practitioners from the United Nations to the U.S. 
Department of State have also deployed the strong, weak, and failed state categories when 
creating policies for addressing everything from the violent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq to the 
nuclear posturing of North Korea. States are considered strong or weak often depending upon 
their capabilities to regulate society, manage social relationships, extract resources, and use 
resources in a determined way.2 Strong states are characterized by a powerful ability to regulate 
social relations and administrative boundaries under a relatively uniform system of government, 
                                                     
1 Foucault, The Order of Things, xix. 
2 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. 
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maintain obvious territorial distinctions over legal jurisdiction, and have clearly defined 
boundaries between those within the state and those outside its authority. 
In the geographical terms of Robert Rotberg, failed states are characterized by their 
inability to control borders and their loss of “authority over sections of territory” where “the 
extent of a state’s failure can be measured by how much of its geographical expanse is genuinely 
controlled…by the official government.”3 Additionally, over the past several decades many 
scholars of globalization have argued that any state, strong or weak, will necessarily suffer a 
degradation of authority and sovereignty as a result of recent events like advances in 
communications technology, global flows of financial capital, and the effects of climate change.4  
China has no shortage of territorial disputes, both inside and outside the country. The 
authority of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), or the “Central 
Government,” over the territories of Tibet and Xinjiang is regularly challenged. Similarly, the 
PRC has never managed to “genuinely control” the territory of Taiwan, despite decades of 
military threats and diplomatic negotiations. China’s racially and ethnically diverse population, 
its exotic territorial arrangements, and its authoritarian governance system fit all of the 
requirements for being a weak and failed state or, following Kenneth Waltz,5 an empire.  
Samuel Huntington famously argued that “third world” states like China need to become 
strong states before they can develop economically6 and many IR scholars have argued weak 
states need authoritarian governance because they are too ethnically diverse. Even prominent 
                                                     
3 Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 5–6. 
4 Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld; Strange, “The Defective State”; Strange, The Retreat of the State; Ohmae, The End of 
the Nation State. 
5 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” 
6 Huntington, The Third Wave. 
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specialists in Chinese politics like Lucian Pye have described China as “a civilization pretending 
to be a state.”7 More recently, IR scholars and practitioners have proposed democratic remedies 
to the problem of weak states. Scott Moore, Michael C. Davis, and Yongnian Zheng have all 
recently suggested the United States as a model China should emulate, especially the process by 
which the early U.S. state managed to confederate, and later federate, territories by combining 
multiple nations under one governmental system and economically develop.8 
However, these proposals for a Chinese federation insist that China conform to the strong 
and weak/failed theoretical model of territorial control rather than develop an alternative account 
of Chinese territoriality. These proposals often fail to mention that China has, in fact, established 
a federal form of government on several occasions with limited success. For instance, after 
fourteen provinces claimed independence from the last imperial dynasty during the Xinhai 
Revolution, for example, the new Republic of China attempted to build the “Great Han Federal 
Democratic Republic” and the movement's leader Sun Yat-sen used the title “President of the 
Provisional Government of the United Provinces of China.” Even after the Communist 
Revolution, Mao was at times in favor of forming a federation of Chinese provinces and the CCP 
established the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi modeled on the federated republics of the 
Soviet Union. However, Chinese federalists have always been careful not to call their system of 
government a “United States” for fear that defining territories as states would be viewed as 
implying separatism. Most current proposals for a Chinese federation fail to understand the 
historical context which makes the possibility of separatism a problem in Chinese politics ever 
since the Qin united the Warring States territories into the first Chinese empire. Second, 
                                                     
7 Pye, “China.” 
8 Moore, “The United States of China”; Davis, “The Case for Chinese Federalism”; Zheng, De Facto Federalism in 
China; Zheng, “Explaining the Sources of de Facto Federalism in Reform China.” 
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proposals for a modern Chinese federation modeled on the United States of America apply a 
Westphalian vision of states as containers for nations and natural resources defined territorially 
by a system of mutually respected borders. In the American Colonies, federalism developed so 
that small democratic states could be counted together as a strong state. Chinese territoriality 
does not arise from the mutual recognition of neighboring states to respect boundaries as in 
Europe or America. Chinese territoriality developed under an entirely different set of historical 
conditions vaguely defined by Chinese scholars as the “Tianxia” system or a highly centralized, 
hierarchical, and bureaucratic system of territorial administration. Terms like “territory,” 
“sovereignty,” and “authority” are recent additions to Chinese governmental vocabularies and 
their transliterated uses are often confusing to scholars and practitioners coming from the Anglo-
European tradition.   
Third, proposals for a Chinese federation assume that China is unique in its relationship 
with developed states. The U.S. administers an exotic array of territories from Washington D.C. 
and Texas to American Samoa and Native American lands. In this regard, China is not unique in 
its relationship with developed states as it already incorporates a diverse array of territories much 
like the U.S. does. What makes China unique is its relationship to developing states, with which 
it has much less in common even if it is seen as similar by many IR scholars. China’s territorial 
management strategies have more in common with the “strong” U.S. state than with the “weak” 
states of Vietnam or Nigeria. Similarly, arguments in favor of a Chinese federation almost 
always suggest China replace its centralized authoritarian government with a decentralized, 
democratic, form of government like those of the United States and United Kingdom. However, 
a key component of China’s territorial management strategy involves recognizing, even 
promoting, an assortment of alternative government or legal systems within its borders. The 
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PRC’s “One Country, Two Systems” (yiguo liangzhi) arrangement with Hong Kong and Macau 
as Special Administrative Zones (tebie xingzhengqu) are the most obvious examples, but there 
are also numerous “autonomous regions” (zizhiqu) which provide special legislative rights to 
minorities, as in Tibet and Xinjiang, and different laws for the Special Economic Zones (jingji 
tequ) like those in Shenzhen and Xiamen. Each of these territories have developed along very 
different processes and historical conditions. Hong Kong is the product of colonization, what 
Chinese nationalists call the “century of humiliation” beginning with the Opium Wars between 
the Qing dynasty and British Empire, and the 1997 “return” of the island to China. Taiwan 
resulted from a long civil war between the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China 
and the CCP shortly after WWII and the interplay of international actors working to keep the 
island independent from the PRC. China’s territorial governance is not as rigid or monolithic as 
IR scholars too often assume. 
Finally, despite slowing in 2015, the Central Party’s series of five-year plans have helped 
China become one of the fastest growing, and now second largest, economies in the world by 
nominal gross domestic product according to the World Bank9 and the largest economy in the 
world by purchasing power parity according to the International Monetary Fund.10 China’s 
“socialist market economy” is also the largest exporter of goods, second largest importer of 
goods, and has the fastest growing consumer market in the world.11 While income inequality 
continues to be high, in early 2016 Beijing’s number of billionaires overtook New York.12 Rather 
than have its authority and ability to expand geographically weakened by the forces of 
                                                     
9 “GDP Ranking.” 
10 “IMF DataMapper.” 
11 Barnett, “China.” 
12 “胡润百富 (Hurun Global Rich List 2016).” 
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globalization, China is becoming increasingly influential as it begins transforming from the 
largest manufacturing economy to the largest consumer in the world and aggressively pursue 
expanding sovereign claim over the territories of the South China Sea. China may not yet be 
counted as a “developed” state, but it is far from weak or failed. 
Despite years of criticism and theoretical failures, the strong vs. weak measure of a 
state’s ability to retain sovereignty and autonomy continues to be the dominant way international 
relations scholars and practitioners theorize states in general, and the Chinese state in particular. 
Outside IR, scholars have begun moving towards a more complex understanding of China and 
Chinese territoriality. Asian Studies scholar John Fitzgerald has recently argued that, rather than 
the strong/weak state classification given by international relations theorists like Rotberg, a 
better measure of China’s power is the way its government can reconcile the complementary and 
sometimes conflicting interests of dispersed territories effectively.13 Similarly, the political 
geographer Carolyn Cartier has asserted that “Chinese space economy is an actively scaled 
territorial mosaic whose dialectical interrelations the state seeks to manage in order to spur 
economic development while simultaneously maintaining political control.”14 Even at different 
scales, as John Agnew points out, the size and shape of China remains a subject of contention 
within China as well as in relation to neighboring countries.”15  
At the same time, critical territoriality scholars like Stuart Elden and Saskia Sassen have 
shown how the dominate description of the nation-state as “bordered power-container”16 with 
                                                     
13 Fitzgerald, Rethinking China’s Provinces, chap. The Province in History. 
14 Carolyn Cartier, “City-Space: Scale Relations and China’s Spatial Administrative Hierarchy,” in Restructuring the 
Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space, ed. Fulong Wu and Laurence J. C. Ma (Taylor & Francis, 2004), 
21-38. 
15 Agnew, “Looking Back to Look Forward,” 307. 
16 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 120. 
9 
 
exclusive control over a territory has a recent and contingent history. Rather than reproduce 
state-centric histories or Westphalian conceptions of territory and territoriality, they urge 
researchers explore “the conditions of possibility of such a configuration”17 and examine how the 
global, the state, the nation, and territories “became assembled into different historical 
formations”18 in the first place. IR scholars need a better way to assess state power than simply 
asserting that weak states cannot control territories and strong states can. Without a historically 
contextualized understanding of the processes by which China manages its complex territorial 
arrangements and creates new territories, or what Alexander B. Murphy calls “sticky” 
territories,19 we are left with a poor accounting of Chinese territoriality and the role China plays 
in contemporary global politics. This dissertation addresses the need for a better theory of 
Chinese territoriality by answering the question: How does China produce, maintain, and hold 
together its multiplicity of territorial arrangements? 
 
Methodology and Scope 
 
To answer the question of what holds China together, I employ the analytic framework of 
“assemblage thinking” articulated by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus 
(1987) 20 and most notably applied by Sassen to analyze the economic and cultural processes of 
globalization,21 Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier to conceptualize neoliberalism,22 and Ignacio 
Farías and Thomas Bender to describe the organization of cities.23 A recently published 
                                                     
17 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 3. 
18 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, 4. 
19 Murphy, “Entente Territorial,” 168. 
20 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. 
21 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. 
22 Ong and Collier, Global Assemblages. 
23 Farías and Bender, Urban Assemblages. 
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collection of interviews and essays by these prominent scholars who have employed assemblage 
thinking to their IR research, Reassembling International Theory (2014) edited by Michele 
Acuto and Simon Curtis,24 provides several helpful examples and methodological suggestions for 
this study. Specifically, Christian Bueger provides several “rules of thumb for the study of the 
international” using assemblage thinking that this dissertation project will apply to the question 
of what holds China together.25 Following Bueger, assemblage thinking is a research program 
where:  
(1) the researcher should be suspicious towards anything that is presented or 
taken to be a coherent whole, whether it is an object, system or logic… 
(2) Thinking multiplicity is an invitation to go beyond binaries and dualisms. 
Classifications such as state/ non-state, human/non-human, modern/post-
modern and material/ symbolic are not explanatory frameworks. They are 
distinctions that require explanations themselves and attention to how they are 
enacted.  
(3) The vocabulary of assemblage is voluntarily poor. It does not want to limit a 
priori what are the most important elements and what their properties are.  
(4) Assemblage thinking implies attention to detail and the mundane activities of 
doings and sayings by which realities are enacted, relations are built and 
ordering takes place.  
(5) This implies an ethnographic gaze, yet there is no singular methodology by 
which assemblages can be opened up. Methodologies are, as Law (2004)26 has 
shown, assemblages in their own right, they order the world in a distinct way.  
(6) In representing assemblages the scholar is inevitably entailed in the enactment 
of an assemblage. Scholars perform the world in distinct ways and not others. 
Representing an assemblage in an academic narrative hence always entails a 
political choice.  
(7) Since assemblages are made of real-time enactment, no representation of an 
assemblage will ever be finite or complete.27 
Assemblage thinking is useful for understanding how components like economic policies, flows 
of capital, remnants of colonial infrastructure, documents and textbooks, ceremonies, political 
                                                     
24 Acuto and Curtis, Reassembling International Theory. 
25 Bueger, “Thinking Assemblages Methodologically: Some Rules of Thumb,” 65. 
26 Law, After Method. 
27 Bueger, “Thinking Assemblages Methodologically: Some Rules of Thumb,” 65–66. 
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offices, taxation, farming,28 census-taking29 and other elements operate to maintain the 
components, their relationships, and their role in assembling Chinese territories. However, 
assemblage thinking should not be confused with simply the thinking on, or about, assemblages. 
As a method, “assemblage” following Sassen, is “an analytic tactic to deal with the abstract and 
the unseen”30 and “thinking,” as described by Michael J. Shapiro, is “used to compose the 
discourse of investigation with critical juxtapositions that unbind what are ordinarily presumed to 
belong together and thereby to challenge institutionalized ways of reproducing and 
understanding phenomena.”31 I understand assemblage thinking to be a method for analyzing the 
abstract and unseen forces holding China together.  
The three islands of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Sansha in the South China Sea are 
exemplary cases of Chinese territoriality. Each island has been historically assembled into 
radically different territories with dissimilar, even antagonistic, relations to the Chinese state. 
Additionally, just as Michel Foucault described “society” as emerging as an object of governance 
through political economy and statistics,32 each of these territories are also what Olaf Corry calls 
a “governance-object” which are “a kind of assemblage in so far as it becomes recognized” but 
unlike other assemblages “it is also somehow rendered governable.”33 This dissertation 
methodically applies assemblage thinking to the significant primary source materials China finds 
necessary to govern Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Sansha as territories.  
                                                     
28 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed. 
29 Scott, Seeing like a State. 
30 Acuto and Curtis, “The Carpenter and the Bricoleur: A Conversation with Saskia Sassen and Aihwa Ong,” 18. 
31 Shapiro, Studies in Trans-Disciplinary Method, xv. 
32 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 
33 Corry, “Global Assemblages and Structural Models of International Relations,” 52. 
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To trace the emergence of Chinese territories as political objects, I apply assemblage 
thinking to historical records and philosophical treaties concerned with territoriality such as The 
Mozi and modern texts like Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1836). 34 The 
chapter on China’s governance of Hong Kong relies upon official political discourses like the 
1841 Treaty of Nanking and 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, as well as recently declassified 
personal accounts of diplomatic meetings between Deng Xiaoping and Hong Kong Governor 
MacLehose.35 The Sansha chapter employs Buger’s rules of thumb for assemblage thinking to 
trace the circulation of texts, economic instruments, island-building technologies, and concepts 
of territoriality expressed in Sansha tourism advertisements, recent speeches made by President 
Xi, and Chinese investments in the international film industry. Applying assemblage thinking to 
these primary sources allows me to analyze the abstract and unseen forces holding China 
together. It is also the method I will use to challenge the institutionalized discourses of Chinese 
territoriality in IR which describe China as a weak state pretending to be strong or make 
normative prescriptions that China must reform itself to resemble nation-states like the U.S. if it 
wants to be a responsible member of the international community. As a result, this project also 
engages with the secondary literature on assemblage theory and Chinese politics in IR.  
My methodological approach and contrast of Chinese with European territoriality is 
indebted to Sassen’s influential assemblage thinking of European territoriality in Territory, 
Authority, Rights.36 However, the scope of this project and its focus on China creates several 
points of disagreement and divergent from the secondary literature’s assemblage thinking on 
territoriality and Chinese politics. For example, unlike the European conceptions of territory 
                                                     
34 Yan, 墨子簡編 (The Mozi). 
35 Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, 214. 
36 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. 
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Sassen uncovers, which arose “from the ground up” and were then later installed as a “built-in 
capability for the emergent territorialities of national states,”37 I find that the PRC employed the 
Qin emperor’s territorial system of classification to redefine Sansha on Xishan Island as a city 
and make historical claims over the South China Sea. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Sansha are 
therefore simultaneously complex arrangements of objects, qualities, and bodies that come 
together for a time to create new ways of functioning that can be measured, mapped, and 
governed by China.38 For this reason, I refer to them as “Chinese territorial assemblages” and 
find that assemblage thinking is the method best suited for understanding how they work. 
 
Chinese Contributions to Assemblage Theory 
 
 Assemblage theory has been widely used in the studies of humanities and social sciences, 
but its meaning, applications, and limits remain the subject of much debate. English Professor 
John Phillips thinks two reasons have contributed to this lack of definition. First is this word is 
generally considered to be the original French word agencement, which is used by Deleuze and 
Guattari. According to Phillips, “Tracing the concept in its philosophical sense back to their 
texts, one discovers that it cannot easily be understood except in connection with the 
development of a complex of such concepts. Agencement implies specific connections with the 
other concepts. It is, in fact, the arrangement of these connections that gives the concepts their 
sense.”39 In this regard, as a study of social science, assemblage is widely used as a “loose 
descriptor of heterogeneous structures, consisting of human as well as nonhuman elements. 
                                                     
37 Sassen, 73. 
38 Deleuze and Hand, Foucault, 36. 
39 Phillips, “Agencement/Assemblage,” 108. 
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While these structures may have a more or less consistent identity, they are at the same time 
constantly put together in a dynamic manner.”40 The second reason Phillips identifies is that “the 
translation of agencement by assemblage can give rise to connotations based on analogical 
impressions, which liberate elements of a vocabulary from the arguments that once helped form 
it.”  When Paul Foss and Paul Patton in 1981 translated Deleuze and Guattari’s article 
“Rhizome,” they use assemblage for agencement. “Since then many (though by no means all) 
translators and commentators have agreed, in a loose consensus, to keep to this early translation 
of agencement by assemblage, while acknowledging that the translation is not really a good 
approximation.”41  
Sassen’s use of assemblage in Territory, Authority, Rights (2008) is similar with what 
Collier and Ong called global assemblages, which by their definition, are “the actual 
configurations through which global forms of techno-science, economic rationalism, and other 
expert systems gain significance. The global assemblage is also a tool for the production of 
global knowledge, taken in the double sense of knowledge about global forms and knowledge 
that strives to replace space, culture, and society-bound categories that have dominated the social 
sciences throughout their history.”42 In a recent interview, Sassen makes this clear by saying she 
is not worried about “what an assemblage is” but that she thinks of assemblages as “an analytic 
tactic to use formats which enables me to bring into the picture pieces of what are, in more 
conventional thinking, thought of as fully fledged institutions.”43  
                                                     
40 Palmas, “Deleuze and Delanda: A New Ontology, a New Political Economy?,” 1. 
41 Phillips, “Agencement/Assemblage,” 108. 
42 Ong and Collier, Global Assemblages, 24. 
43 Acuto and Curtis, Reassembling International Theory, 18. 
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The differing approaches to Deleuze and Guattari’s use of agencement and assemblage in 
Anglo-European scholarship becomes even more complicated when considering the circulation 
of these concepts in Chinese academia. Several theories from Deleuze and Guattari were inspired 
by Chinese philosophy and other concepts, like the “body without organs,” fit surprisingly well 
with Chinese theories of how the world works.44 In 2010, Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House 
released a Chinese translation of A Thousand Plateaus made by philosopher Yuhui Jiang.45 
Translating complex concepts from French into Mandarin is a difficult task which required Jiang 
to make some artful substitutions. Jiang translated agencement into simplified Chinese as 配置 
which carries a military connotation and refers to advantageous deployment of material, soldiers, 
and weapons against an enemy or a strategic placement of pieces on a chess board. Jiang’s 
translation is far different from the messy and distributed agency of things Anglo-European 
scholars have tended to read into Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of assemblages. This 
difference is not only a matter of translation but a result of state pressures on Chinese academia.  
The publication process for Chinese scholarly journals is similar to the Western system of 
peer-review with final decision to publish a text resting on the chief editor, but the importance of 
the state cannot be ignored in Chinese academia. Most of the major journals and research 
institutions in China are heavily dependent on the state for funding. Additionally, the CCP 
Propaganda Department regularly reviews published materials and the state further regulates 
academic publishing by issuing printing permits. As a result, Chinese academic publications are 
                                                     
44 My mother, who recently retired from her career practicing medicine in China, asked me to describe a theory 
from the Deleuze and Guattari book I had open writing this section. I translated a paragraph on the “body without 
organs” and my mother thought I was reading a medical textbook. As a medical student, my mother was taught 
that the body consists of "overlapping systems" and the chi’s "spheres of energy” or a “system that reflects the 
flows of the world.” She was glad to hear that Deleuze and Guattari did not believe the Western idea that the body 
is “meat” cut up into specific functions. 
45 Jiang, 资本主义与精神分裂（卷2):千高原 (A Thousand Plateaus). 
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often normative and aimed at solving specific policy problems. In his contrast of the academic 
literature on the concept of sovereignty in Anglo-European journals with Chinese journals, Sow 
Keat Tok describes the situation as one in which “By and large, Chinese academic papers are 
often problem-solving endeavours, packaged in a scholarly manner that draws references to 
intellectual origins.”46 Additionally, the difficulty of translating texts into Chinese means there is 
a considerable time delay between the major debates of Anglo-European and Chinese 
international relations scholars. Chinese translations of major classical and modern works by 
Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Hume, Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, and lately Foucault can be easily found 
in China. Given the policy-oriented focus of Chinese academia, however, the only contemporary 
Anglo-European writers quickly translated into Chinese tend to be the normative work of policy-
oriented scholars like Joseph Nye, John Mearsheimer, Alexander Wendt, and Kenneth Waltz. 
Very few or no translations of prominent contemporary critical IR theorists like Saskia Sassen, 
Stuart Elden, James Scott, and Michael J. Shapiro or even critical China scholars such as Lynn 
White and William Callahan have been made. 
The academic orientation towards policy recommendations in China has also meant that 
very few scholars have attempted to use Deleuze and Guattari to address questions of Chinese 
politics, through several recent conferences in China and publications outside the country 
demonstrate a growing interest in their work. In addition to Jiang’s translation of A Thousand 
Plateaus, Henan University recently held a symposium on “Deleuze in China,” the University of 
Nottingham Ningbo held another symposium on “Deleuze, Guattari and China,” and the First 
International Deleuze Studies in Asia Conference was held in 2013 at Tamkang University. 
                                                     
46 Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 54. 
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These events resulted in a recent special issue of Deleuze Studies edited by Paul Patton,47 another 
in Theory & Event, also edited by Paul Patton with Craig Lundy,48 and a special issue of the 
Journal of Chinese Cinemas on “Deleuze and Chinese Cinemas” edited by David Martin-Jones 
and David H. Fleming.49 This sudden flurry of work applying Deleuze and Guattari to the study 
of China has provided novel readings of Chinese literature and painting,50 observations on the 
translation of Anglo-European concepts into Chinese,51 and explored how the recent migration of 
workers from villages to cities is influencing traditional Chinese social relations.52 However, the 
only published attempt to explore how China assembles together its multiplicity of territorial 
arrangements so far is the 2011 inaugural issue of Cross-Currents on “Territoriality and Space 
Production in China” edited by You-tien Hsing.53 The difficulty of translating the often explicitly 
non-normative philosophic concepts of Deleuze and Guattari to normative debates over policy 
may also help explain why, aside from a handful of philosophy articles, Jiang’s translation of A 
Thousand Plateaus has had little impact on Chinese academia and no discernable influence on 
Chinese international relations scholarship so far.  
Additionally, most Anglo-European scholars refer to Chinese people, places and things 
using the Romanized pinyin system for Chinese words. Pinyin is becoming more common across 
China and the Chinese diaspora, but there are still significant differences even within the pinyin 
system especially between Mainland China and Taiwan. For example, the leader of the Republic 
                                                     
47 Patton, “Introduction.” 
48 Lundy and Patton, “Deleuze in China.” 
49 Martin-Jones and Fleming, “Special Issue.” 
50 Yin, “Becoming-Animal”; Wong, “The Melodic Landscape.” 
51 Bogue, “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature”; Lee, “Translating Deleuze”; Braidotti, “Nomadic 
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of China, 蔣介石, is Jiang Jieshi in pinyin on mainland China and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan 
but is sometimes also spelled Chiang Chieh-shih depending on the source. Translation is 
complicated by the fact that Chinese people, including Chiang, often change or use different 
names several times throughout their lives. Similarly, the point closest to mainland China on 
Taiwan island is Jinmen in the pinyin system but is also known as Quemoy or Kinmen in 
colloquial and official documents. This dissertation will follow the academic convention of 
recent decades and use the common hanyu pinyin system of mainland China when an English 
translation is not available.  
Applying concepts originally written in French converted to simplified Chinese 
characters for an English language dissertation on territories which have long been governed in 
Mandarin, Cantonese, and traditional Chinese characters may require more transliteration than 
translation. However, as Xavier Guillaume notes in his comparison between varying English 
translations of agencement, “Translations can be conceptually alienating but also liberating.”54 
Anglo-European scholars from Sassen to Manuel DeLanda have tended to translate Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assemblage theory into a means of drawing attention to the ephemeral, contingent, and 
seemingly irrelevant forces shaping international relations. Jiang’s translation of agencement into 
the strategic concept 配置, or peizhi in pinyin, makes sense within the policy-oriented and state 
dominated environment of Chinese academia. But peizhi also provides an alternative to the 
common practice of using assemblage thinking mainly as a means of critiquing conventional 
theories in international relations. In his review of the ways scholars have used assemblage 
theory to challenge traditional concepts in IR, Graham Harman asserts that “Now that the battle 
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against stasis and abstraction is won, perhaps the next battle is to recover the non-relational 
autonomy of assemblages, with a renewed focus on stability and its merely intermittent crises. 
But this would mean the transformation of assemblage theory into something else altogether.”55  
IR scholars have often been interested in the assemblage thinking method for challenging 
the assumption that states are containers of societies and act as strategic or self-interested 
entities. These scholars argue that a more dynamic ontologies like assemblage theory recognizes 
the flow, fluidity, and contingency of the state form. However, this dissertation also recognizes 
that one of the most durable assemblages in the world today are states and that states do contain 
peoples, things, and even temporalities. The state is not the natural order of things but, as 
Stephen Collier points out, “it is an important feature of our order of things.”56 The People’s 
Republic of China, for example, was only recently established after WWII, but the PRC also 
contains 5,000 years of Chinese history, capacities of statecraft, and social organizations. The 
Chinese state is also able to organize coherent action at a national and planetary scale. The 
Chinese territoriality also prioritizes the role of the state in the governance of a region and the 
Chinese way of organizing territory is always understood to be a function of the territory’s 
placement within the administrative hierarchy. In the Chinese administrative system, regions are 
considered to be places to be governed and are not understood to be regions which exist before 
governance.  
China is not distinctly assemblage-type state distinct from the Westphalian model of 
container-states. Applying Jiang’s strategic translation of assemblages allows this project to do 
more than just contest the idea that states are containers for nations, raise questions about the 
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viability of nation-states as central political actors, or prove that the strong or weak states theory 
fails to adequately describe every situation in international relations. Peizhi contributes to the 
existing scholarship on assemblage theory by accounting for the strategic processes by which 
many forces, including a centralized and authoritarian state, arrange heterogenous peoples, 
autonomous regions, and disputed territories into the durable assemblage we call China. 
  
Contributions to the Study of Chinese Territoriality 
 
In his landmark book Human Territoriality (1986), Robert Sack defines territoriality “as 
a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area” and, 
in terms similar to what Deleuze and Guattari call “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization,” 
Sack finds that “as a strategy, territoriality can be turned on and off.”57 For Sack, territoriality is a 
form of human behavior which employs delimited space as a means of reaching specific political 
and social goals. Since Sack, political geographers have disagreed over the role of the state in 
human territoriality. Peter Taylor, for example, has asserted that territoriality is “a fundamentally 
state-centric social process”58 and Alexander B. Murphy has criticized Sack for having a 
“conception of territory [which] is very much rooted in understandings of space that developed 
in conjunction with the modern state system.”59 Elden and Sassen have also persuasively shown 
that this concept of territoriality, like the nation-state, emerged from the economic, philosophic, 
ideological, and technological conditions specific to Renaissance Europe.60 
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Scholars interested in Chinese politics have tended to view the development of Chinese 
territoriality in ahistoric and primarily economic terms. The success of government policies like 
the 1978 “Reform and Opening up” (gaige kaifang) reforms, which established new institutions 
and adjusted territorial arrangements to create Special Economic Zones with special tax 
incentives to attract foreign investment, seems to confirm the developmental economist’s view 
that Chinese territoriality is driven by economic behavior (especially in terms of customs and 
tariffs). However, as Claude Raffestin has pointed out, behaviorist accounts of territoriality tend 
to describe “a product rather than a process” 61 and reproduce assumptions about the regional and 
urban planning practices of western-style democracies or liberal markets.62 This can lead to 
surprisingly narrow conclusions about Chinese territoriality. Robert Ash and Y. Y. Kueh in a 
special issue of The China Quarterly devoted to the possibility of a new economic Greater 
China, for example, argued in 1993 that the political goal of reintegrating Taiwan with mainland 
China had already been accomplished by increased trade between both territories because 
“economic integration is essentially a process of unification.”63 Events like Taiwan’s rejection of 
the CCP’s “One China” Consensus and suspension of cross-strait communications in 1992, the 
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the sharp rise of Taiwanese nationalism in recent decades, 
and the election President Ma and other Taiwanese politicians viewed as being too friendly to 
China in 2016 show that economic behavior is only one force among others producing 
contemporary Chinese territorial assemblages.  
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Raffestin suggests an alternative approach which resonates with assemblage theory by 
defining territoriality “as the ensemble of mediated relationships linking individuals and/ or 
social groups with exteriority and alterity” or “a set of relationships rooted in ties to the material 
environment and other people or groups, and mediated by existing techniques and 
representations.”64 For Raffestin and this study, territoriality is process that defines and sharpens 
spatial boundaries and non-spatial processes, including historical configurations and 
representations which have since become components of other assemblages. Sassen describes 
this process, borrowing from complexity theory, as the circulation of “capabilities” built with a 
specific arrangement of historical conditions and institutions that can become part of new 
organizational logics that have little to do with the original. For example, the divinity of the 
French monarchy was originally legitimated by the Pope but was later invoked to establish 
autonomy from the papacy with a secular form of sovereignty the French Revolution tried to 
replace with popular sovereignty. Nationalism and patriotism are “capabilities developed through 
territorial kingship and its claim to divine origins”65 which dislodged from the decomposing 
feudal order only to be relodged within modern nation-state and international assemblages of 
territory, authority, and rights. China developed some of these territorial capabilities along 
similar lines as European states but with some significant differences.  
In 230 B.C.E., King Zheng of Qin took advantage of a severe famine and devastating 
earthquake to begin conquering the other Chinese kingdoms of Han, Zhou, Yan, Wei, Chu, and 
Qi. Zheng changed his name to Shihuangdi, literally “First King Emperor,” integrated the Zhou 
and Qin dynasty governments, abolished feudal holdings, and required noble families to live in 
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the new capital city under surveillance to create the first Chinese empire. The Qin held the 
former Warring States together by standardizing units of measurement, distance, and written 
Chinese characters. The Qin also tied the states together by building a national road and canal 
system that facilitated the collection of taxes using a new standardized currency. The national 
roads and canals could also be used to easily supply and quickly deploy the Qin’s large army. 
Almost immediately after conquering the last kingdom of the Yellow River Plain, Shihuang also 
began efforts to expand the new Chinese empire by sending his armies south against the Yue 
tribes and sending farmers from the central plains to colonize lands occupied by Xiongnu 
nomads.  
The Qin transformed the cosmological and philosophical concept of “tianxia” or “all 
under heaven” into a political system managed by a new bureaucratic organization that came to 
be called the “administrative hierarchy” (xingzheng quhua). It was during this period that a new 
durable Chinese territorial assemblage emerged which the influential Chinese political theorist 
Liang Qichao describes as a reimagining of the gap between the geographical coverage of the 
Qin empire and its political system to a new cosmographic territoriality66 organizing people, 
places, and things by their physical proximity to Shihuang. Unlike the European model of 
territoriality emerging from the Middle Ages which Sassen summarizes as a system “based on 
mutual ties, hierarchical but not clearly deﬁned,”67 this new assemblage clearly became 
geographically centered on the Yellow River Plain and hierarchically below the Tian Zi “Son of 
Heaven.” In other words, during the Qin dynasty, tianxia went from describing the cultural 
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practices uniting Chinese people “all under heaven” into a moral, ethical, and territorial strategy 
to “unify all under heaven.”68 
The Qin dynasty did not last long but the tianxia assemblage of Chinese territoriality 
became the dominant organizational logic for subsequent dynasties and developed capabilities 
which would become relodged in modern territorial assemblages. After the Qin dynasty 
disintegrated, the capacities of centralized government run by a professional class of bureaucrats 
became relodged in the Han administrative hierarchy. Even after the Xinhai Revolution and 
Communist Revolution in the 20th century, territorial capacities developed with the Qin and Han 
dynasties continue to circulate in contemporary Chinese assemblages. Redeploying Qin and Han 
capabilities, the PRC organizes territories into an administrative hierarchy according to 
population size, geographic conditions, historical traditions, political governance, and economic 
strength within an administrative hierarchy. Under the Central Government in Beijing, the levels 
are ranked with the provincial level (shengji xingzheng qu) at the top, followed by the 
prefectural-level (diji xingzheng qu), county-level (xianji xingzheng qu), township-level (xiangji 
xingzhenqu), at the bottom the village-level (cunji xingzheng qu). Each level is administered by a 
dual administrative structure similar to the Qin, but with party elites instead of an aristocracy 
working alongside the professional class of state bureaucrats empowered to exercise economic 
power, political autonomy, and legal jurisdiction over a fixed territory.69  
Most scholars agree that the hierarchical and China-centric tianxia system disintegrated 
after it came into violent contact with the Western world order in the late Qing dynasty. Earl 
                                                     
68 The Warring States period philosopher Mozi was among the first scholars to describe tianxia as more than just a 
set of unified moral or cultural values. In The Mozi he redefines tianxia as a project of Chinese political unification 
directed by the Son of Heaven in Yan, 墨子簡編 (The Mozi), chapters 11-13: 109-153. 
69 Chung, “State Regulation and China’s Administrative System.” 
25 
 
Macarney’s famous refusal to perform the traditional kowtow ceremony expected of vassals 
before the Son of Heaven in 1793 and the Qianlong Emperor’s refusal to deal with King George 
III as an equal sovereign are often cited as the beginning of the end for China’s tianxia territorial 
assemblage. The subsequent military losses to European and Japanese naval powers, and the loss 
of territories like Hong Kong and Macau in “unequal treaties” to Great Britain and Portugal, 
made it impossible to continue insisting on the superiority of everything Chinese. However, 
recent critics like Tok have complicated the apparently radical transition of China from tianxia to 
the Westphalian world order by drawing attention to the circulation of capabilities, technologies, 
and people developed outside China that became lodged within the formal institutions and 
informal practices of Qing governance. The late Qing dynasty’s “Self-Strengthening” movement 
(ziqiang yundong) of the 1860s led by the influential reformer Zeng Guofan to fend off foreign 
powers and prevent domestic unrest by adopting Western technologies is the most salient 
example. The Qing incorporated Western technologies of war by buying guns and retrofitting 
ships with European cannons. They also studied and adapted Western technologies of statecraft, 
elevating their treatment of Westerners from people existing outside the Chinese cultural sphere 
(fan) to members of political organizations (guo) and rearranged bureaucratic structures to create 
the Zongli Yamen or Office of Management of the Affairs of All Foreign Countries. This new 
office cautiously recognized the sovereignty of foreign nations and helped transform the Chinese 
Emperor from a dynastic ruler with the Mandate of Heaven to the temporary occupant of China’s 
seat of power or head of state. This office played a critical role in incorporating capabilities of 
Anglo-European nation-states into the Qing territorial assemblage by, among other things, 
translating texts like Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1836) into Mandarin and 
circulating them within the Chinese administrative hierarchy.  
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While scholars like Tok have questioned the popular narrative that the disintegration of 
the weak Qing state coincides with the disintegration of the tianxia system, little attention has 
been payed to the circulation of tianxia components in contemporary IR. The massive 
development of industrial capabilities and high-levels of economic growth in China since the 
reform and opening up policies, coinciding with the de-industrialization and fading economic 
power of the United States after 2008, has put a growing number of Chinese products, people, 
and territorial concepts into positions of power. Many Chinese scholars have recently called for 
the creation of a new “China School” of international relations citing the inability of Western 
democracies to address international problems like climate change and the United States’ 
increasingly belligerent use of military force in the Middle East and Africa. One leading voice 
for the China School, philosopher Tingyan Zhao, prefaced his rejection of the weak vs. strong 
state debate in a February 2018 opinion editorial for The Washington Post by asserting that “we 
are headed beyond failed states to a failed world order.”70 According to Zhao, “the most 
important political problem today is not the so-called failed states but the failed world”71 
resulting from the Westphalian organization of Hobbesian individuals in competition with each 
other and the cooperative demands of new globalized economic and information sharing 
networks.  
In the policy-oriented language of Chinese academia, Zhao has a solution to the failed 
Westphalian world. Aligning with President Hu Jintao’s use of ancient philosophy to name the 
CCP’s transition of leadership from Jiang Zemin “Socialist Harmonious Society,” Zhao proposes 
a transition in international relations from the Westphalian world order to a modern form of 
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tianxia. Callahan has criticized Zhao’s proposal by pointing out that Zhao ignores the numerous 
changes tianxia underwent during its long history, assumes the conquests of imperial China were 
peaceful, and draws attention to the ways China’s “contemporary history in Tibet, Taiwan and 
Xinjiang is instructive for what happens to difference that prefers to stay outside and not be 
transformed into a ‘friend’.”72 Agreeing with Callahan, critics like Ban Wang find that Zhao’s 
proposal to dislodge tianxia from its imperial Chinese encasement and install it in a world 
institution wavers between “the quest for universal principles and ideological justification for 
domination.”73  
This project contributes to the growing literature on Chinese territoriality by 
contextualizing the development of tianxia as it related to “foreign” Chinese living outside the 
Yellow River plain on the islands of Hong Kong and Taiwan. It also contributes to Callahan and 
Wang’s resistance to the China School’s goal of re-centering the world on China by applying the 
de-centering analytic framework of Deleuze and Guattari to this imagined global tianxia system. 
This dissertation will show the ways in which China, even when accepting territoriality as a key 
principle of IR, interprets and applies territoriality differently than its international counterparts.  
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 1: Tianxia Territoriality: Foreign Chinese Relations and “One Country, N Systems” 
 
 This chapter traces the reformation of tianxia territoriality as China was forced to develop 
new relationships with imperial European, American, and Japanese states and the “foreign” 
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Chinese living under colonial rule. It begins by describing Chinese foreign relations to 
“barbarians” before the Opium Wars and the late Qing empire’s attempt to use Western 
technologies of international statecraft to defend against territorial losses. Next, it shows how the 
translation of Westphalian territorial concepts from Wheaton’s Elements of International Law 
continue to influence Chinese governmentality. Finally, this chapter critiques the China School 
project to reassemble ancient Chinese philosophy, modern foreign relations, and contemporary 
economic capabilities into a new hegemonic global tianxia assemblage. 
 
Chapter 2: Reterritorializing Hong Kong: Rocks, Walls, and Tianxia Cultural Governance 
 
 
The first case study of this project focuses on the development of contemporary Chinese 
territorial assemblages by contrasting China’s management of Hong Kong with Taiwan. It begins 
by recounting the colonization of the island by Chinese immigrants, the recolonization of the 
“barren rock” by Great Britain, and reformulation of the tianxia system after the Chinese 
Emperor was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 and recognize the “extraterritoriality” 
of British subjects. Following Ó Tuathail’s observation that “every deterritorialization creates the 
conditions for a reterritorialization,”74 I next show how China manages Taiwan using a “fleet in 
being” strategy or what Deleuze and Guattari called a “vector of deterritorialization”75 and Great 
Britain prepared Hong Kong for Chinese reterritorialization by demolishing the anarchic 
Kowloon Walled City. Finally, this chapter draws attention to cultural governance projects aimed 
at encouraging Hongkongers and Taiwanese to identify as Chinese. Specifically, I analyze the 
ways in which the PRC hopes to manage a revival of tianxia culture by sponsoring the 2002 film 
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Hero about the Qin unification of China directed by the influential Chinese director Zhang 
Yimou and starring famous mainland Chinese, Hongkongese, and Taiwanese actors.  
Chapter 3: Tacky Territorial Assemblages: Building Sansha City in the South China Sea 
 
The second case study of this dissertation concentrates on China’s recent island-building 
projects in the South China Sea. These artificial islands, and China’s claim that 2,500 occupants 
of Sansha live in a Chinese city, have been the subject of serious debate and contention as China 
attempts to territorialize significant amounts of hydrocarbon reserves in traditionally 
international waters near Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. This chapter contextualizes 
China’s 2012 promotion of the Sansha to a prefecture-level city within the government’s 
administrative hierarchy as a strategy for extending territorial control over the Spratly Islands, 
the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. It is 
tempting to describe China’s effort to “striate” the formerly “smooth” space of international 
waters to create what Murphy calls a “sticky” territory. However, I argue that the geopolitics of 
the South China Sea and difficulty China has maintaining its artificial islands Sansha an unstable 
“tacky” territory for international relations and the PRC. 
The concluding chapter begins by summarizing the primary methods China uses to 
produce, maintain, and hold the territories of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Sansha together as a 
contemporary Chinese assemblage. While the scope of this project is limited to these island 
territories, I indicate how future research might apply assemblage thinking (especially in the 
Chinese transliteration peizhi) to critically account for China’s management of the autonomous 
mainland territories Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia. I argue that 
assemblage thinking could also be used to challenge institutional discourses in IR reducing 
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China’s recent agricultural investments in Tajikistan and Africa to colonial “land grabbing” 76 or 
celebrating China’s massive $8 trillion “One Belt and One Road Initiative” as rebuilding the 
ancient Silk Road77 to help, as Xi Jinping puts it, “people and things flow” more efficiently 
between Asia and Europe.78 This research resists the dominant strong vs. weak state or Tianxia 
vs. Westphalian world order debates in IR and instead describes China’s current expressions of 
territoriality and its future place in the world. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Tianxia Territoriality:  
 
Foreign Chinese Relations and “One Country, N Systems” 
 
 
Formerly Portugal presented tribute; 
Now England is paying homage. 
They have out-traveled Shu-hai and Heng-chang; 
My Ancestor’s merit and virtue must have reached their distant shores. 
Though their tribute is commonplace, my heart approves sincerely. 
Though what they bring is meagre, yet, 
In my kindness to men from afar I make generous return, 
Wanting to preserve my good health and power. 
—Qianlong Emperor on meeting the first British envoy to China in 179379 
 
 
 Ever since it was first proposed in the 19th century that China’s failure to prevent the 
invasion of Western powers into Chinese territories resulted from its peculiar approach to foreign 
relations, international relations scholars and practitioners have made it standard practice to 
describe traditional Chinese foreign relations as a “tributary system.” Additionally, after John 
King Fairbank’s influential study in the 1930s, Chinese and Anglo-European scholars have often 
conflated the tributary system with the concept of “tianxia” or the organization of lands, space, 
and area under the divinely sanctioned cultural authority of the Chinese emperor. In their recent 
response to Tingyang Zhao’s analysis of tianxia, for example, Yongjin Zheng and Barry Buzan 
describe traditional Chinese foreign relations as a “tributary system not just as a structure of 
strategic interaction and economic exchange between Imperial China and other participants in 
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the system, but as an articulation of the existence of international society in East Asia.”80 Zhao 
argues that tianxia and the “China School” are an alternative to the Westphalian international 
state system and the “English School” of IR. Critics of Zhao’s reading of tianxia like Zhang Feng 
and William Callahan have pointed out that IR scholars often assume that China was “somehow 
radically different from the foreign policies of other great powers in history”81 and, especially 
after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, have tended to describe policies or ideas in terms of Chinese 
exceptionalism or as “having Chinese characteristics.”82 However, Zhang and Buzan also assume 
that Chinese states have historically conformed to the Cold War-era American theories that 
international cooperation and conflict result from the interaction between rational and self-
interested states by describing Zhao’s tianxia as a “game theoretical approach” to traditional 
Chinese foreign relations.83 Zhang and Buzan, and even critical scholars like Sow Keat Tok, 
recognize that the tributary system was constantly being contested and breaking down but 
account for these inconsistencies by citing Stephen Krasner’s argument that the “organized 
hypocrisy” of participants’ discourses and behaviors in international society often violate 
longstanding norms without challenging the system’s legitimacy.84  
In contrast, Peter Perdue has gone to great detail to show that any semblance of a 
tributary system in East Asia was “never stable, fixed, nor uniform”85 and John Wills has also 
pointed out that “the tribute system was not all of traditional Chinese foreign relations.”86 Odd 
Arne Westad goes further to argue that “there was no tributary system” and Perdue has pointed 
                                                     
80 Zhang and Buzan, “The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice,” 6. 
81 Feng, “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System,’” 547. 
82 Callahan and Barabantseva, China Orders the World, 252. 
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Theory and Practice,” 29; Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 27. 
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out that the idea of a Chinese tributary system was “created by Western scholars, to describe a 
mystical, ineffable Oriental reality which is claimed to be inaccessible to Western or Eastern 
minds—except the mind of the Oriental scholar himself.”87 In short, while many studies have 
advanced the tributary model and several have challenged it, few researchers have explored the 
other relations of people and things the “tributary system” model of Chinese foreign relations has 
to systematically exclude in order to identify the key constraints and possibilities of Chinese 
politics. 
This is where Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage, or more accurately Jiang’s 
translation of assemblage as the strategic concept peizhi, comes in handy because it rejects 
totalizing systems without rejecting systematicity. Assemblage or peizhi does not reproduce 
Zhao, Zhang, and Buzan’s assumption that traditional Chinese foreign relationships necessarily 
constitute a closed system or “Chinese world order” and allows this study to contribute to 
Callahan, Wills, and Perdue’s critiques of the tributary system by interrogating what constitutes 
the basic ingredients of Chinese foreign relations. As noted in the introduction, the concept of 
tianxia or “all under heaven” first emerged during the Warring States period (475–221 B.C.E.) 
and described the common ritual and literary practices of “civilized” people living in Yellow 
River Plain. The first Chinese emperor, Qin Shihuang, began the process of transforming tianxia 
into a strategy for unifying Chinese territories hierarchically below the geographically unbound 
authority of the emperor. Under the subsequent Han dynasty, tianxia began involving the 
payment of tribute and performance of Chinese ceremonies by “inner” and “outer” barbarians 
alike. However, there was never any consistent agreement as to what counted as a payment of 
tribute, tributes payment from vassals were often intermittent or disrupted by domestic 
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rebellions, and on several occasions Chinese emperors were forced to pay tribute as vassals to 
other empires. Similarly, as Perdue points out, the supposed cultural alternative to military force 
of the tribute system and tianxia territoriality ignores the estimated 3,756 wars fought between 
Chinese states from 770 BCE to 1912 AD, and the Ming dynasty’s initiation of at least one 
conflict every four years with the Mongols.88 
Rather than imagine a model of traditional Chinese foreign relations and fit the terms of 
those relationships into a model tributary system or international community, this chapter 
employs assemblage thinking to reveal how, following Deleuze, “the assemblage’s only unity is 
that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’” and in Chinese foreign relations it was 
“never filiations that are important, but alliances, alloys.”89 These sympathies and alloys of 
Chinese relations can be most clearly seen during the 19th century not because of the failure of 
any traditional model of Chinese foreign relations to be reconciled with a Westphalian model, 
but because China suddenly had to develop new relationships with territories that had been 
Chinese until taken by Great Britain, Portugal, France, Japan, and other imperial states. This 
chapter begins by exploring how the late Qing dynasty, Republic of China (ROC), and People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) managed their relationships with foreign powers and the newly foreign 
Chinese people living in colonies using territorial capabilities developed by Qin, Han, and Ming 
administrative hierarchies. I argue that the tianxia territorial assemblage incorporated 
international and foreign peoples even before the concept of “national” and “international” or 
distinctions between issues domestic and foreign were part of the administrative hierarchy. Next, 
I consider how Qing administrators plugged territorial capabilities developed by the modern 
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imperial states of France, Great Britain, and the U.S. into the late tianxia territorial assemblage.  
The translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1836) is especially 
important for understanding how 19the century Anglo-European capacities for managing 
populations, territories, and later citizens continues to shape contemporary Chinese foreign 
relations. Finally, this chapter contextualizes Deng Xiaoping’s “One Country, Two Systems” 
proposal for the reunification of Taiwan and Hong Kong by showing how it incorporates 
capabilities from earlier Chinese territorial assemblages and late additions like the “one 
diplomacy, two systems” (yige waijiao liangzhong tizhi) developed under the Qing.90 By 
exploring the development and circulation of territorial governance capacities through ancient 
and modern China, this chapter provides an alternative analysis of traditional Chinese foreign 
relations and the conditions necessary for the emergence of contemporary China’s “one country, 
two systems” territorial assemblage. 
 
Tianxia Capabilities for “Cherishing Men from Afar” 
Like the Roman Empire and Christendom of Middle Ages Europe, Chinese tianxia 
territoriality did not recognize any boundaries or make any distinction between foreign and 
domestic except in terms of their proximity to the central plains of China. Fairbank summarizes 
Chinese foreign relations from the first to the last dynasty as a concentric hierarchy of zones with 
nearby tributaries like Korea, Vietnam, and the Ryukyu Islands (and sometimes Japan) placed 
higher in the hierarchy than nomadic and ethnically non-Chinese people living at the fringe of 
Chinese culture like the tribes which sometimes pushed in on the Great Wall or Russian peoples 
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of Siberia. The remaining lands and non-Chinese “outer barbarians” (wai yi) were not understood 
to be foreigners but peoples ordered lower in the tianxia hierarchy by their cultural distance from 
the emperor. Inner and outer barbarians were expected to observe Chinese rituals and pay regular 
tribute to the emperor, usually in the form of local products and rare gifts. The emperor, in 
return, sent a greater amount of tribute back to “vassal” states and granted feudal lords heritable 
titles. Members of the Qing court, including the emperor, liked to call these events of exchange 
the ritual of “cherishing men from afar.”91 Political organizations posing less physical threat and 
more cultural affinity with the Chinese core were ranked higher in the vassal hierarchy than other 
groups regardless of their physical distance from the central plains.  
Tianxia tended to treat foreign relations as an external expression of the same principles 
of political and social order within Chinese society and the state. Philosophical texts from the 
Warring States period like the Mencius, Xunzi, and Han Feizi describe tianxia as a form of 
cultural unity superseding the political disunity of the feudal states (guo) with their separate 
rulers, government bureaucracies, and armies. The Qin transformation of tianxia into an imperial 
and territorial expansionist concept was paradoxical from the beginning. Shihuang, for example, 
proclaimed himself the Son of Heaven and ruler of all under heaven while simultaneously 
connecting a series of walls into the Great Wall to keep Huns, Xiongnu, Turks, Oirat, Tartar, and 
the Jurchen peoples out of the Yellow River Plain. The tianxia understanding of territoriality also 
helps explain why Chinese governance, culture, and language could continue to hold the empire 
together even after barbarians like the Mongol Kublai Khan or former Manchurian vassals like 
Hong Taiji overthrew a sitting Han Chinese emperor and claimed the Mandate of Heaven for 
themselves. It did not matter much who was emperor or where they came from, only that the 
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imperial influence (te) was maintained by subjects performing the proper ceremonies (li), even 
where the emperor lacked power to enforce his regulations or laws (fa).92  
The Qin held Chinese territories together by developing several territorial governance 
capabilities that disappeared during the ROC but became relodged within the PRC’s 
administrative hierarchy. The centralized bureaucracy of the Qin facilitated counting and 
taxation by organizing farmland into rectilinear grids, subdivided into fields demarcated by roads 
and footpaths with acreage determined by the amount of land one family could cultivate. This 
reorganization of land broke down villages from closed communities with strong family loyalties 
and replaced kingship relations with five and ten family squads modelled on the organization of 
the Qin army.93 The Qin also divided its newly conquered territories into 36 administrative units 
each managed by a military commander, a civil governor, and an inspector. Shihuang introduced 
a strict legal code which standardized everything from currency and weights to the length of 
chariot axles.94 Shihuang abolished the remaining privileges of feudal lords by replacing their 
governors with professional bureaucrats, outlawed serfdom, discouraged local coalitions by 
resettling elites away from their traditional homelands, and prevented separatism by heavily 
regulating literacy. The Qin standardized the size and shapes of written Chinese characters and 
ordered most existing books, except utilitarian texts on agriculture and medicine or histories of 
the State of Qin, to be burned. According to the official records, Shihuang further standardized 
written Chinese by burying 460 scholars alive for owning forbidden books in local scripts by 
Confucius and his students.95 The meritocratic administrative bureaucracy of the Qin shattered 
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competing feudal, clan, and regional identities by making the emperor the sole arbiter of a 
government officials’ success in life. The Qin governed China using two types of administrative 
structures, retaining the ancient system controlled by personal relationships to the emperor that 
might broadly be called an aristocracy and a professional bureaucracy given fixed salaries, 
territorial jurisdictions, and controlled by written correspondence.  
After the Qin dynasty disintegrated, the capabilities of centralized government run by a 
professional class of bureaucrats became relodged in the Han administrative hierarchy with some 
important differences. The Han used the Confucian texts which Shihuang had banned to 
highlight the ethical and religious power of the emperor granted by the “mandate of heaven.” 
The Han also used these texts to ensure their administrators would share a common language, 
moral code, and textual community regardless of which territories or level of government they 
were sent to administer. The imperial examination system developed by the Han tested 
candidates once a year for government office on their ability to recite from memory and debate 
key texts of Confucian philosophy. Where the Qin imposed its centralized bureaucracy and strict 
literacy controls on local elites to keep them from competing over traditional feudal claims, the 
Han divided and conquered by encouraging elites to compete for scholastic authority and rank 
within the administrative hierarchy. Among other things, candidates for government office were 
tested on their ability to compose an “eight-legged essay” applying concepts like “harmonizing 
tianxia” drawn from the “Four Books” and “Five Classics” of Confucianism like the Analects, 
the Great Learning, the Mencius, and later the pragmatic commentaries of Zhu Xi. 
 Even after the Xinhai Revolution and Communist Revolution in the 20th century, 
institutional capabilities developed by the Qin and Han dynasties to govern territories continued 
to circulate in contemporary Chinese assemblages. Modifying the Qin and Han institutional 
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processes slightly, the PRC today organizes territories into an administrative hierarchy according 
to population size, geographic conditions, historical traditions, political governance, and 
economic strength. Under the Central Government in Beijing, the levels are ranked with the 
provincial level (shengji xingzheng qu) at the top, followed by the prefectural-level (diji 
xingzheng qu), county-level (xianji xingzheng qu), township-level (xiangji xingzhenqu), at the 
bottom the village-level (cunji xingzheng qu). Each level is administered by a dual administrative 
structure similar to the Qin, but with party elites instead of an aristocracy working alongside the 
professional class of state bureaucrats empowered to exercise economic power, political 
autonomy, and legal jurisdiction over a fixed territory.96 The last dynasty abolished the imperial 
examinations, but the Republic of China created the Ministry of Examination and Ministry of 
Civil Service to test potential government officials in China after overthrowing the Qing. The 
ROC continues its examination system under those administrative bureaucracies today in 
Taiwan. Students in mainland China spend 12 years preparing to take the two-day and nine-hour 
Gaokao college entrance exam. After graduating from college, candidates for government 
positions take the yearly administered five-hour Civil Service Exam which consists of 135 
multiple-choice questions on mathematics, language, and law followed by three-hours of 
answering essay questions on topics like the application of ancient Chinese water metaphors to 
modern governance or the effects of the National Development and Reform Commission’s 
economic policies on rural healthcare.97 Members of the civil service and party officials in China 
today share the experience of spending years to prepare for the official examination and belong 
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to a textual community based on exam preparation textbooks, Xi Jingping’s The Governance of 
China Vol. I98 & Vol. II,99 and the People’s Daily.  
Unlike the “one country, two systems” expression of Chinese territoriality in the late 20th 
century, tianxia foreign relations depended on vassal states regularly sending tribute and 
delegates to perform the kowtow ceremony of three bows and nine prostrations before the 
emperor. The exchange of tribute began with the exchange of hostages as Emperor Wu of Han 
began expanding the territories unified by the Qin. Wu exchanged hostages and gifts with the 
Nanyue kingdom to form an alliance against the Minyue kingdom. After defeating and resettling 
the Nanyue people to lands between the Yangtze and Huai rivers, Wu exchanged hostages and 
gifts with the Yelang kingdom in alliance against his former Nanyue allies to expand the Han 
empire further south. Wu also exchanged hostages and entered into marriage alliances with the 
Xiongnu people of the northern steppe, before expanding the empire across the Gobi Desert and 
pushing the Xiongnu into Siberia. Another territorial strategy Wu developed to control a newly 
conquered kingdom like the Dian in eastern Yunnan was to leave local kings their traditional 
authority and titles but require them to send regular tributary payments and ritually abase 
themselves before the emperor at court. Later dynasties would use similar strategies to expand 
Chinese control and manage the territories of Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.100  
The Han dynasty also began temporarily occupying the capital of a neighboring 
kingdoms to extract regular tributary payments or establish the emperor’s authority over Chinese 
trade. Paying tribute usually required the vassal state to present local products or tribute 
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memorials to the emperor and perform the kowtow ceremony. The emperor sent tribute missions 
back with gifts, often of greater value than those offered by the vassal, and symbols of office like 
heritable titles, official calendars to ensure future tribute would be sent on time, and imperial 
grants of trade privileges with the capitol and frontiers. Korea has become the “model vassal 
state” for scholars calling this arrangement the tributary system101 because of its long history of 
regularly sending tribute to the Chinese emperor. The Ryukyu islands, Vietnam, Siam, Burma, 
and Nepal regularly performed the part of vassals in the tianxia assemblage, but Feng and Perdue 
have recently shown that these relationships were far more complex than subservient kings 
paying a form of taxes or subordinating their sovereignty to the Chinese emperor. After forcibly 
seizing power from the Yuan dynasty, for example, in 1369 the new Ming emperor Hongwu sent 
an envoy to Korea for tribute. This envoy, Feng argues, shows that “Hongwu’s main concern, 
therefore, was to extract overt symbolic acknowledgement from foreign rulers of China’s 
cosmological centrality and affirmation of the legitimacy of his succession to the dynastic 
authority.”102 This tributary mission did not extend Chinese control over Korea but tried to 
establish the primacy of Chinese interests in trade relations with Korea and gave the king of 
Korea some authority over the legitimacy of the new Chinese emperor. In return, the Chinese 
emperors offered investiture for Korean rulers and feudal lords. This arrangement mirrors some 
of the ways imperial Rome managed captured territories, but submission to the Chinese emperor 
did not necessarily extend China’s territorial control. Contrary to Zhang and Buzan’s assertation 
that Chinese tributary relations constituted a prototype of contemporary “international society,” 
the tianxia territorial assemblage was not based on the mutual respect of borders between states 
or held together by Chinese “institutions that help to define norms of acceptable and legitimate 
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state behavior.” 103 For example, when the Chinese government sent an official to install a new 
king in the state of Champa in 1474, the official was blocked by the Vietnamese who had 
invaded and conducted a genocidal campaign since 1471. The emperor did nothing except send 
the official to Malacca for tribute instead. A decade later, the Malacca informed the emperor that 
their tributary mission to China was attacked on the way home by the Vietnamese but had not 
retaliated because they feared punishment from the emperor for using their military without his 
permission. The emperor responded by berating the Malacca and ordered them to attack 
Vietnam. 104 The Champa, Malacca, and Vietnamese were all Chinese vassals that maintained 
consistent tributary relations within the tianxia territorial assemblage.  
Even exemplary vassals like Korea did not spontaneously submit to the cultural and 
political authority of the Chinese emperor. Emperor Hongwu tried to curry favor by reducing the 
frequency of Korean tributary missions to once every three years and, alternatively, refused to 
invest the Chosen dynasty founder King T’aejo until Korea promised to reinforce Ming security 
in the northeast of China. Feng argues that events like this resemble “blackmail” more than any 
formal tributary system.105 In the 1590s, the Ming dynasty helped drive Japanese and Manchu 
occupation armies out of Korea. After the Manchus toppled the Ming in China, Korean 
continued sending tribute but also continued using the Ming calendar and secretly expressed 
contempt for the new Qing rulers by refusing to call them by the Ming titles of nobility the Qing 
tried to adopt.106 Later, the Qing emperor Kangxi appealed to Mongolia for support by citing the 
common heritage of Mongols and Manchus. Kangxi also set aside Chinese Confucian hierarchy 
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for Mongolian Buddhist beliefs in universal benevolence to better ingratiate himself with the 
Khan. On several occasions, the Qing also supplied Mongols with grain, livestock, supervision 
over legal disputes, and feudal titles which seems to reverse the supposed superiority of the 
Chinese emperor by paying the tribute a vassal would usually send to the Mongols. However, 
this was not necessarily unusual as Perdue notes “the techniques used by the Ming and Qing to 
legitimize their rule over their subjects and to claim superiority over rival empires did not differ 
radically from those of other early modern empires”107 and gift exchange has been a major part of 
Asian social life for centuries. If this complex series of relationships constitutes a tributary 
system, these events show that the relationship was not unilateral and did not always give 
Chinese administrators much control over distant territories or barbarian vassals.  
However, the Qing also developed significant capabilities for accommodating and 
managing autonomous regions that the administrative hierarchy could reassemble into a new 
method for governing heterogenous territories. For example, the Qing recognized the autonomy 
of Kokand and used its relationship with the Central Asian Khanate as a model for negotiations 
later with the British in Canton.108 The early Qing administrative hierarchy managed its relations 
with Korea, Japan, Burma, Thailand, and all other “interior” territories by establishing the 
Ministry of Rituals. A subsidiary bureaucracy organized of the Ministry of Rituals named the 
Office of Border Affairs managed the “exterior” territories occupied by Mongols, Zungars, and 
Russians. The Office of Border Affairs arranged travel accommodations for tributaries and paid 
tribute, or bribes, from the emperor to tribes on the northwest crescent of Chinese territories to 
keep them from forming an alliance with each other against the empire.109 Before the Opium 
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Wars, the tianxia territorial assemblage made no hard and clear distinctions between domestic 
and foreign zones of influence. Generally, “exterior” territories were understood to be regions 
that would eventually become “interior” as they had with the Han expansion south and north. 
When European colonial powers began encroaching on the Chinese sphere of influence, the 
Ming and Qing administrative hierarchy treated them much as they would the distant vassals of 
India and Russia, managing relations with the Office of Border Affairs, exchanging gifts and 
tributary missions, and placing Anglo-European powers into the tianxia assemblage as distant 
potential tributary states that could be played off one against another. 
The development of territorial capabilities like a meritocratic bureaucracy to prevent 
feudal and local challenges to Qin rule were dislodged by the Han and later relodged in the 
territorial administrative hierarchy of later dynasties. For example, following the disastrous 
collectivization of agriculture of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, farmland was divided up and 
assigned to families using the same subdividing techniques employed by the Qin to break up 
village and regional solidarities. The tianxia assemblage and administrative hierarchy was also 
able to manage a wide array of complex territorial relationships from the emperor’s court and 
surrounding regions to the autonomous zones of Kokand and tributary Ryukyu islands. However, 
19th century conflicts like the Taiping Rebellion and Opium Wars forced China to reassemble 
itself as a modern nation-state and develop new relations to the suddenly foreign Chinese people 
living in Macao, Hong Kong island, the Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories, and Taiwan. 
The administrative hierarchy also had to develop new ways to accommodate the 
“extraterritoriality” of Anglo-European foreign diplomats, traders, and merchants.  
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Foreign and “Overseas” Chinese Relations 
 Chinese and European historians have long agreed that the hierarchical and China-centric 
tianxia world disintegrated after it came into violent contact with the Western world order in the 
late Qing dynasty. Earl Macarney’s famous refusal to perform the traditional kowtow ceremony 
in 1793 and the Qianlong Emperors’ refusal to recognize King George III or Queen Victoria as 
equals are often cited as examples of China’s backward “closed-door policy” (biguan suoguo) or 
inability to confront the reality of being a peripheral power to the Westphalian international 
system. Scholars have tended to reproduce the evidence and opinions of nationalists writing after 
the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 who referred to this period as the beginning of the “hundred years 
of national humiliation” (bainian guochi)110 in which the Qing lost control over Chinese 
territories, peoples, currency, and the opium trade. Europe had been importing porcelain, silk, 
and tea from China for centuries, but by 1830 Great Britain was facing a serious trade imbalance 
as the consumption of its imported Chinese tea rose to 30,046,935 pounds with an average 
annual consumption of 1.1 pounds per head.111 China was importing some products from Britain, 
but at a far smaller rate, which caused a massive flow of silver out of the British global trade 
network into China. To get the key monetary medium of this period back into circulation, the 
British East India Company began selling opium grown in its Indian colonies to China traders in 
exchange for silver, even though the Company knew smoking and selling opium had been illegal 
in China since 1729.  The Qing attempted to reassert the administrative hierarchy’s control over 
opium circulation in China by banning the opium trade and ordering a blockade of all foreign 
trade with Canton. The Royal Navy used gunnery power, later called “gunboat diplomacy,” to 
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inflict a series of decisive defeats on the Qing Empire. However, even after China’s defeat in the 
Opium Wars and the British forced the Emperor to open ports to foreign traders with the1842 
Treaty of Nanjing, it took 20 years for Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand to end their tributary 
missions to the Qing court and another 20 years for China to replace its remaining tributary 
relationships with treaties.112 Fairbank points out that “Westernization was not the only response 
available” to China and it was not until the late 1880s that “Western barbarians” had “the 
capacity to dominate the Chinese continental land mass.”113 Even after losing the first Opium 
War, from the Chinese perspective it was the Western system that was slow to adapt to China’s 
well-functioning tianxia institutions and the treaty system which seemed so new to modern 
Westphalian nation-states was little more than a redecoration of tributary relations.  
 However, the loss of territories like Hong Kong to Great Britain and Macau to Portugal 
required some innovative reassembling of tianxia, and preparing territorial capabilities and 
technologies developed by other states for incorporation into the Qing administrative hierarchy. 
The “Self-Strengthening” movement (ziqiang yundong) during the 1860s led by the influential 
reformer Zeng Guofan to fend off foreign powers and prevent domestic unrest by adopting 
Western technologies is one notable reassemblage. The Qing incorporated Western technologies 
of war by buying guns and retrofitting ships with European cannons. They also studied and 
adapted Western technologies of statecraft, elevating their treatment of Westerners from people 
existing outside the Chinese cultural sphere (fan) to subjects of a tributary state (guo). Before the 
Self-Strengthening movement, the Qing court managed its territories and tributary relations with 
two bureaucracies, the Ministry of Rituals and the Office of Border Affairs. Zeng created a new 
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bureaucracy to deal with the peculiar Western expectations for recognition as members of their 
international community and diplomacy called the Office of Management of the Affairs of All 
Foreign Countries or Zongli Yamen for short. This new office competed with the Ministry of 
Rituals and Office of Border Affairs, creating what bureaucrats in the Qing administrative 
hierarchy derisively described as “one diplomacy, two systems” (yige waijiao liangzhong 
tizhi).114 However, the Zongli Yamen was a significant attempt to incorporate Anglo-European 
institutional capabilities, language, and diplomatic practices into the tianxia territorial 
assemblage. The Zongli Yamen implicitly recognized the sovereignty of foreign nations and 
helped transform the Chinese Emperor from a dynastic ruler with the Mandate of Heaven to the 
temporary occupant of China’s seat of power or head of state. The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, for 
example, was signed between the “Great Qing Emperor” (Da Qing Huangdi) and the “King of 
the British Empire” (Da Ying Guo Junzhu), but by the 1860s the Zongli Yamen was requiring 
diplomats to draft treaties in the Western manner between the “Great Qing Empire-State” 115 (Da 
Qing Guo) and the governments of France, England, Russia, and Japan. 
The Zongli Yamen also contributed to the Self-Strengthening movement’s reassembling 
of Chinese territoriality by sponsoring the translation and circulation of Anglo-European texts on 
modern nation-state methods of governance. After the invasion of Chinese territories by 
European powers in the 1840s, geographically and culturally close countries like Vietnam, 
Korea, and the Ryukyu islands ended their tributary relationship with China to become colonies 
of Japan and France. When distant countries like Thailand and Burma began citing international 
law to justify ending their tributary payments to the Chinese Emperor, the Zongli Yamen hired 
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an American missionary, William A. P. Martin, to translate Henry Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law (1836). Many China scholars credit Wheaton’s book with introducing China 
to Anglo-European concepts like sovereignty and rights. Tok, for example, provides a linguistic 
analysis of the Martin translation to “lay down the fact that sovereignty is a non-native concept 
to Chinese political thinking.”116 Comparative legal scholars like Stephen C. Angle have instead 
argued that Martin’s translation served to make sovereignty and rights “part of an existing 
discourse almost as much as they begin a new one” for Chinse governmentality.117  
Alternatively, Wheaton’s book can also be understood as a bundle of legal, international, 
and linguistic capabilities developed by modern European and American states to govern their 
own territories that circulated among a handful of elite Qing administrators until portions became 
lodged in the late Qing territorial assemblage. The emperor’s uncle and head of the diplomatic 
agency, Prince Gong, used a pre-publication draft of Martin’s translation to force Prussia into 
releasing Dutch merchant ships anchored in a Chinese port and pay China a $1,500 penalty for 
infringing upon China’s territorial waters.118 Courses for the first generation of Chinese 
diplomats were structured around Martin’s translation and civil service exams included questions 
on Wheaton’s discussion of jurisdiction, human rights, and territorial sovereignty.119 The 
influence of discourse on practice in these examples is clear, but treating Wheaton’s book as a 
bundle of modern or Westphalian state capacities also helps explain differences between Chinese 
policy statements and actions. I-cheng Loh, for example, dismisses China’s insistence that the 
Taiwanese delegation to the World Health Organization be referred to as “Chinese Taipei” or the 
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Hongkongese Olympic teams be officially listed as “Hong Kong, China” as a “Battle of 
Commas.”120 Tok also sees China’s interest in correct naming as a discursive attempt to claim de 
jure territorial sovereignty over Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the South China Sea because China 
cannot exercise de facto direct or coercive control over a territory.  
However, these discourse analyses leave open the possibility that Chinese academics and 
administrators use the language of sovereignty and territoriality but express those concepts in 
different ways from their Anglo-European counterparts. At least some of China’s popular image 
as an aggressively expansionist state can be attributed to the official use of words like quan 
which Martin introduced to the Chinese lexicon as a translation, and sometimes conflation, of the 
terms “rights” and “authority” exercised by colonial Great Britain in the 19th century.121 
Similarly, members of the Self-Strengthening movement often had to translate Western concepts 
and international capacities in ways that would appeal to established Chinese practices. Article 1 
of the Treaty of Nanjing, for instance, required “peace and friendship between Her Majesty the 
Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of 
China” and the extraterritoriality of “their respective subjects, who shall enjoy full security and 
protection for their persons and property within the dominions of the other.”122 The 
extraterritorial arrangement of jurisdiction based on identity rather than geography was not new 
in China. After the Jurchen Aisin Gioro clan of Manchuria toppled the Ming dynasty and 
installed the first Qing Emperor, the Qing dynasty placed the Manchu elite outside the 
jurisdiction of Han Chinese administrators. In the 1830s, the Qing granted extraterritoriality to 
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traders from the Uzbek khanate of Khoqand.123 However, as the Zongli Yamen and other 
members of the Self-Strengthening movement attempted to reassemble Qing territoriality from 
tianxia to a modern nation-state, they also had to reconstitute people of the middle kingdom as 
“subjects” of “His Majesty the Emperor of China” and later “citizens” of the Republic of China. 
The reformer Qinchao Liang did this by fitting the Victorian-era concept of subjects into the 
Confucian tradition of renewal as “new people” (xinmin) and the citizenry as “state people” 
(guomin) “defined not through individual rights but through their political membership.”124 
Article 1 of the Treaty of Nanjing could be plugged into the Qing territorial assemblage by 
redefining the territorial arrangement China made with Manchu elite and Khoqand traders as a 
jurisdictional arrangement under international law for British state people within the small 
territory of treaty ports. Initially, the new people of China who committed a crime within the 
boundaries of a treaty port like Shanghai were remanded to the Qing government, but later 
Chinese and British state people were both tried by the local Mixed Court in the International 
Settlement and the British Supreme Court for China where Qing officials were often ignored.125 
This arrangement continued until the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty and 
reconstituted Chinese territoriality and citizenship again as a “democratic republic of the 
people.”126 
In addition to losing jurisdiction over foreigners, and the circulation of silver and the 
regulation of opium in China, the Treaty of Nanjing forced the Qing to cede “the island of 
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Hongkong” from the province of Guandong “in perpetuity” to Great Britain.127 Immediately after 
ratifying the treaty, the Daoguang Emperor instructed the Chinese administrative hierarchy to 
move the headquarters of Guandong government from Xin’an County to a new sub-district on 
the Kowloon Peninsula of mainland China across from Hong Kong island.128 The Qing also 
began building fortifications that would later become the famous Kowloon Walled City in case 
British military forces attempted to invade mainland China. In 1860, the British army did indeed 
invade Kowloon in the Second Opium War. After losing again, the Qing emperor was forced to 
cede Kowloon and later “lease” the surrounding “New Territories” to Great Britain for 99 years 
rent-free. British military commanders, diplomats, and generations of historians have called 
Hong Kong island before 1840 a “barren rock,” but Hong Kong has a long history in China. 
Hong Kong had been one of the territories unified by the first dynasty of China and, as the 
historian and former colonial official James Hayes points out, the island had “several villages of 
some size, as well as hamlets, and a few larger coastal villages…[with] established institutions of 
the kind that is usual in Chinese communities, including the shrines and temples that were the 
object of periodic and special rites through the calendar year.”129 China had colonized Hong 
Kong several times before the British, but in 1840 the Chinese living in Hong Kong suddenly 
became the subjects of distant imperial states. Qing subjects and Chinese vassals became the 
xinmin new people citizens or guomin state people of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Japan. 
Many of China’s major political figures from the 20th century lived in these “lost territories” and 
among the foreign or “overseas Chinese” including Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Zhou Enlai, 
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and Deng Xiaoping—the architect of China’s “one country, two systems” territorial arrangement 
for Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
 
The “One Country, N Systems” Territorial Arrangement 
 
Recovering the territories and Chinese people lost to European powers by the Qing 
became an overt goal of the ROC and PRC as they tried to reconstitute China as a modern 
nation-state to overcome the 19th “century of humiliation.” For the territorial nationalists, the 
Chinese nation was not based on civic or ethnic affiliation but historical claims to particular 
territories. Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalists defined those territories as the regions controlled by 
the Qing at their time of maximum expansion, and Chiang Kai-shek went further to insist that all 
Qing territories had historically been “permeated by our culture.”130 Even the internationalist 
Liang advocated for Chinese state-building, though he would later criticize Western nationalism 
as jingoistic and argue that “The Chinese people have never taken the state as the highest entity; 
they believed there must be an entity higher than the state and exercising control over all states. 
That was tianxia.”131 After Republic of China withdrew to Taiwan led by Chiang’s Kuomintang 
army, creating another lost territory populated by hostile overseas Chinese, the PRC had little 
interest reclaiming territories or nation-building. Instead, the PRC focused on building the 
Communist International and liberating the subjects, now “comrades,” of capitalist imperialism. 
However, during their alliance with the CCP in 1933 the Soviet Union had recognized the 
“Uyghur people” as a distinct ethnic group and, following Soviet ethnic policy, had helped 
organize a revolution against the Kuomintang for Xinjiang’s territorialized autonomy. 
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Kuomintang rule over Xinjiang was replaced by the PRC with the understanding that China 
would become another Soviet republic, but when 60,000 ethnic Uyghurs emigrated to USSR 
territory in Kazakhstan in May 1962132 the PRC began demanding the return of Outer Manchuria 
territories ceded by the Qing to Tsarist Russia during the century of humiliation.  
China’s break with the Soviet Union, the Korean War, and civil unrest in minority 
regions encouraged the PRC to adopt stronger border controls and launch a series of nation-
building projects. The 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China made no mention of 
lost territories, but the 1978 constitution was among the first official assertions by the PRC that 
“Taiwan is the sacred territory of China. We must liberate Taiwan, to accomplish the great task 
of reunifying the motherland.”133 Ten months after the constitution was ratified, Deng announced 
the reform and opening-up policies meant to reintegrate China with the global economic system 
and opened Shenzhen, on the border with Hong Kong, to foreign investment as a “special 
economic zone.” This change in policy signaled an end to any official plans to liberate Hong 
Kong from British capitalist imperialism. Instead, the PRC planned to use Shenzhen to learn 
from the British how to develop a similarly successful industrial and commercial territory on 
mainland China. According to the official history of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Deng also offered Taiwan reunification with China as a special autonomous economic and 
administrative zone as part of what he later called the “one country, two systems” territorial 
arrangement.134 Shortly after the ROC refused, Deng invited the Governor of Hong Kong to 
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Beijing and unofficially signaled the PRC’s intent to reclaim all of the Hong Kong territories 
after Great Britain’s 99 year lease on the New Territories expired in 1997.135  
In official documents, the PRC maintains that the “concept of ‘one country, two 
systems’” originated with Chairman Mao’s statement in 1960 “that provided Taiwan is returned 
to the motherland, with the exception of foreign affairs which must be handled by the national 
authorities, all the military and political power and the power of appointing officials may be 
delegated to the Taiwan authorities.”136 Mao had actually consistently argued until his death that 
Taiwan and Hong Kong could not be reunited with China without first converting them to 
socialism, but during his time in power Mao showed little interest in these lost territories. When 
asked about Hong Kong by Western journalists, Mao reportedly said that “China has enough 
trouble in her hands to try and clean up the mess in her own country, leave alone trying to rule 
Formosa [Taiwan], for us to clamour for the return of Hong Kong. I am not interested in Hong 
Kong; It has never been the subject of any discussion amongst us.”137 Despite Mao’s numerous 
statements to the contrary, Deng promoted Mao as the original architect of reunification to make 
“one country, two systems” palatable to conservatives within the PRC who feared that 
reintegrating a capitalist Taiwan or Hong Kong would lead to a capitalist takeover of China.  
The question of Mao and Deng’s willingness to grant Taiwanese military autonomy after 
reunification with China has confused many scholars who agree with Max Weber that modern 
states are defined as having a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
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territory.”138 Even scholars interested in presenting a non-Western view of Chinese politics like 
Tok have tended to see China’s guarantee of military autonomy for Taiwan as evidence that 
China’s only interest in “one country, two systems” is naming rights. Their assumption that 
China would have to conform to Webster’s model of a modern state seemed to have to have been 
confirmed after the 1997 Transfer of Sovereignty when the PRC garrisoned troops from the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Hong Kong, but the PLA has since remained largely 
confined to its camps and is rarely visible except during public relations events like the handover 
anniversaries or PLA Day. Aside from some uniform insignia changes and renaming of 
bureaucratic offices, the Hong Kong Police Force and Judiciary of Hong Kong operate with little 
interference from Beijing. The “one country, two systems” territorial arrangement also gives 
Hong Kong an autonomous legal system and police forces.  
China controls the flow of goods and foreign capital in mainland China, but it also plugs 
into the global financial system by allowing Hong Kong banks to set interest rates, run an 
independent Stock Exchange, and print a separate currency from the Renminbi. China regulates 
the flow of people between Hong Kong and the mainland using “Immigration Checkpoints” and 
capabilities developed by the Zhou and Qin administrative hierarchies like the Hukou system of 
household registration. Hong Kong is allowed to control the flow of humans and goods between 
the territory and the rest of the world using institutional capabilities developed by the British to 
regulate commerce between Crown colonies. For example, Hong Kong continues the relatively 
“open border” with Hong Kong maintained by the British colonial government to facilitate the 
“coolie trade” of Chinese chattel labor after Great Britain outlawed the African slave trade and 
later institutions which ensured Hong Kong firms would have access to cheap labor. Hong Kong 
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allows citizens from 170 countries to enter Hong Kong visa-free but requires travelers from 
mainland China to obtain a “re-entry permit” to enter Hong Kong for a limited period and limited 
number of times. These border controls provide Hong Kong with ready access to mainland 
China’s cheap labor market and the systematic exploitation of more than 320,000 foreign 
domestic workers, primarily women from the Philippines and Indonesia, who are legally required 
to live in their employer’s residence.139 China also allows Hong Kong to issue its own passports 
for residents travelling abroad. Extending Weber, John Torpey describes passports and identity 
cards as products of modern states trying “to monopolize the legitimate means of movement.” 
Given China’s willingness to reunify with “lost territories” without insisting on a state monopoly 
over the legitimate use of violence or means of movement, it is easy to see why so many 
international relations and Chinese studies scholars have tended to view China’s policies towards 
Hong Kong and Taiwan as a mere discursive “Battle of Commas.”140 
However, this chapter has shown that Chinese politics has long accommodated a wide 
array of divergent territorial arrangements that has not conformed to Webster’s definition of 
nation-states or the Westphalian state model based on the mutual respect of borders. Since the 
Qing first unified China as a tianxia territorial assemblage, the administrative hierarchy has 
governed by accommodating other systems of local administration, traditional ethnic practices, 
and open systems of foreign trade and tribute exchange between vassal states with independent 
(even at times antagonistic) military forces. Similarly, the practice of incorporating autonomous 
regions with separate legal, economic, and administrative systems from those governing the 
capitol was a common feature of Chinese politics long before Deng declared that Hong Kong, 
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Macau, and Taiwan could be integrated into China as “Special Autonomous Regions.” The 
republican government, for example, created four “Special Administrative Regions” for the 
Jehol, Suiyan, Shahar, and Sikang provinces to bring former Manchu territories and other 
minority regions into the administrative hierarchy of the Nationalist Government.141 
Rather than describe China’s management of Hong Kong and Taiwan as unique 
compared to its other territories, Tok points out that it is more appropriate to formulate 
contemporary Chinese territoriality as “one country, n systems”142 where n represents a 
potentially unlimited variability of territories and peoples, economic and political systems, and 
foreign relations that can be plugged into China’s administrative hierarchy. Despite the tendency 
of discursive analyses to conclude that China’s management of Hong Kong and Taiwan is little 
more than a contest over the right of naming, Deng often liked to say that “It doesn't matter 
whether the cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.”143 Whether we call these 
arrangements a new tributary system,144 a tianxia revival,145 or the Chinese world view,146 the 
“one country, two systems” territorial assemblage expresses “a spatial strategy to affect, 
influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area.”147  Several of the institutional 
capabilities colonial Britain and China later developed to control Hong Kong have been useful 
for extending China’s territoriality over Taiwan and the South China Sea. The mobilization of 
resentment Chinese nationalists used to regain control over European colonies, for example, is 
now being turned towards overseas Chinese and former tributary. President Jiang Zemin, after 
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overseeing the Hong Kong Transfer of Sovereignty, described the possible return of Taiwan as 
“using snow to clean up the blood of the hundred years of national humiliation.”148 Similarly, an 
academic study of Chinese foreign policy published immediately after the Transfer of 
Sovereignty argues for continuing to expand into the South China Sea by asserting that “The 
history of the century of humiliation of the Chinese race continually tells us: foreign races invade 
us via the sea. Experience repeatedly reminds us: gunboats emerge from the Pacific Ocean; the 
motherland is not yet completely unified; the struggle over sovereignty of the Spratlys, 
Diaoyudao and the Sino-Indian boundary still continues.”149 As the CCP moves to 
“derevolutionise” Chinese politics in favor of “renationalization,”150 the coercive military and 
economic aspects of traditional Chinese territorial governance are being augmented by what 
Shapiro calls “progressively intense cultural governance, a management of the dispositions and 
meanings of citizen bodies, aimed at making territorial and national/cultural boundaries 
coextensive.”151  
This chapter began by tracing the development of administration capabilities used by the 
late Qing, ROC, and PRC to govern its relationships with foreign governments and foreign 
“overseas” Chinese. In contrast to the literature on ancient and modern China’s international 
“tributary system,” I argued that capabilities developed by the Qin, Han, and Ming 
administrative hierarchies like the creation of a meritocratic bureaucracy, standardized Chinese 
writing, territorial divisions, and the ritual exchange of gifts and titles with vassal states 
constituted China as tianxia territorial assemblage. This chapter also explored the historical 
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conditions necessary for the contemporary emergence of a “one country, n systems” Chinese 
territorial assemblage which employs capabilities developed by modern nation states, especially 
the colonial states of Great Britain and France, to manage Hong Kong and attempt to control 
Taiwan.  
Many IR scholars and democratic activists predicted before 1997 that China would be 
unable to successfully manage Hong Kong without forcing it to conform with the PRC’s 
autocratic system of government and planned socialist economy. During the countdown to 1997, 
Western media often depicted Hong Kong as a bastion of democracy and Milton Friedman 
famously lamented the Transfer of Sovereignty as a premature end to the world’s greatest 
experiment in laissez-faire capitalism.152 However, these predictions failed to account for the 
deep imprint British colonialism has left on the territory of Hong Kong. The colonial government 
of Hong Kong had a long history of creating monopolies in industries from banking to the 
telephone company which favored British firms. The colonial government also introduced 
democratic elections for a handful of government offices and universal suffrage only after China 
announced its intent to reclaim the territory. Hong Kong has been organized for the benefit of 
distant masters since the British began colonization in 1842. As a former colony, Hong Kong 
may be easier to plug into the “one country, n systems” territorial assemblage than territories that 
resulted from civil war like Taiwan or the new islands China is building in the international 
waters of the South China Sea. Paradoxically, because Hong Kong’s territorial status is no longer 
in question, China has done little to restrict Hong Kong’s independent participation in 
international relations. China has even encouraged the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices 
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to open branches outside the territory in Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei, London, Geneva, Washington 
D.C. and thirteen other major financial centers.  
China manages Taiwan in exactly the opposite way, openly challenging its international 
autonomy while exercising no control over Taiwan’s domestic sphere. Hong Kong is unique as 
the last and most economically successful colony to leave the British Empire and the only 
territory to be decolonized without also gaining independence. China’s attempts to prevent 
Taiwanese autonomy in international relations and its recolonization of Hong Kong has inspired 
many challenges to China’s national authority. China has responded by performing its 
commitment to building a “harmonious society” and multicultural modern nation-state. The 
Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, for example, began with a multiethnic 
presentation of children (later revealed to all be Han) carrying the Chinese national flag and 
dressed in the traditional costumes worn by China’s 56 ethnic groups. Similarly, academics like 
Zhou emphasize the cultural and cosmopolitan components of the tianxia territorial assemblage 
over its coercive military and economic to present “Greater China” or Chinese hegemony as an 
unproblematic expression of contemporary international relations.153 The process of preparing 
Hong Kong for Chinese reterritorialization, China’s continual deterritorialization of Taiwan in 
international relations, and the reformation of tianxia as an object of Chinese cultural governance 
is where I turn next. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Reassembling Hong Kong and Taiwan: 
Prophylactic Independence and Tianxia Cultural Governance 
 
 
 An old woman wanted to sell her 200-year-old Yinxing Zisha teapot in the 
marketplace. A traveler came by and at her invitation drank tea she poured from 
the teapot. It was the best tea he had ever tasted, and he offered to buy the teapot 
for a large sum. While he went away to get cash to pay her, she became conscious 
of the used appearance of the teapot and, because he offered her so much money 
for it, she scrubbed the teapot until it shone. When the traveler returned and saw 
that the tea stains had been washed clean, he told the old woman that the teapot 
was worthless. The old woman had destroyed the accumulated sediment of years 
and years of tea leaves that had made every cup from the teapot taste wonderful. 
 
—Politburo member Li Ruihuan, March 1995154 
 
 
 Li Ruihuan famously responded to questions about how communist China would govern 
capitalist Hong Kong after the 1997 Transfer of Sovereignty by telling the old Chinese story 
above. By telling this allegory, Li was implying that the CCP did not understand the conditions 
that made Hong Kong economically successful. Li went on to warn the China’s administrative 
hierarchy that “if you don’t understand something, you are unaware of what makes it valuable 
and it will be difficult to keep it intact.”155 Like other members at the head of the Communist 
Party of China following the death of Mao, Li could only describe China’s interest in Hong 
Kong’s capitalist economy using euphemisms and allegory. Ever since Deng announced the 
reform and opening up policies, IR and China studies scholars have debated whether China 
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represents a continuing threat to international capitalism or proves that there is no real alternative 
to capitalism. Callahan, for example, argues that China “is best understood as a right-wing 
authoritarian party-state that gains legitimacy from a harsh form of capitalism and a primordial 
style of patriarchal nationalism.”156  
However, even those scholars in agreement with Callahan often have difficulty placing 
China and Hong Kong within the spatial dimensions of capitalism. The geographer David 
Harvey argues that capitalism survives by producing new spaces of accumulation and exporting 
capital to devalue currency or what he calls capitalism’s constant search for a “spatial fix.”157 
Hong Kong complicates Harvey’s argument about capitalism in several ways. First, the territory 
has a long history of devaluing the cost of labor by importing Chinese workers from the 
mainland and facilitating China’s global labor exports as a major node in the coolie trade. 
Second, during long periods of the Cold War, half of the hard currency earned by the PRC came 
from selling food and water to Hong Kong.158 The first major trouble China had controlling Hong 
Kong came the day after the Transfer of Sovereignty when Thailand’s currency devaluation 
sparked the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The non-convertibility of Chinese renminbi and foreign 
investments in physical assets like factories insulated mainland China from most of the financial 
shocks, but the PRC hierarchy had to collaborate with the new Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) to address the crisis. China was forced to spend $1 
billion to keep the Hong Kong dollar from devaluating and the HKSAR bought HK$120 billion 
worth of shares in various Hong Kong companies to keep them from going bankrupt and the 
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Hong Kong Stock Exchange from crashing.159 Taken together, these events call Harvey’s strictly 
“economistic” approach to globalization and the economic value of Hong Kong to China into 
question. 
In contrast to Harvey, You-tien Hsing describes contemporary Chinese spatial production 
as the “territorialization of capital,” especially “industrial, financial, and symbolic capital.”160 
Hsing also notes that “spatial planning has superseded economic planning as the primary tool of 
accumulation” in China since 1978 and calls for further study of “how different types of capital 
are territorialized in different types of spaces.”161 Sassen’s work considers the ways in which 
“state-centered border regimes” like China are not always territorial. However, she also argues 
that the durability of state territoriality shows its compatibility with ongoing processes of 
“debordering,” “rebordering,” and the formation of new rival territorialities at the local and 
global scales.162 Both Hsing and Sassen creatively employ Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage 
theory to describe contemporary state territoriality and China’s territorialization of capital. This 
chapter follows their lead, but focuses more attention to the processes of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and what Marshall Johnson and Fred Chui call the 
“sub-imperial relations between the dominant of the dominated and their periphery.”163 In Anti-
Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the territoriality of early capitalism in England began 
as a process which took peasants off the land (deterritorialization) and then put them into 
factories (reterritorialization).164 They revisit these concepts in A Thousand Plateaus but, in 
relation to assemblages, describe territorialization as a “double-becoming” in which every act of 
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deterritorialization creates new forms of reterritorialization.165 More recently, critical 
globalization scholars like Ó Tuathail and Waleed Hazbun have argued that every act of 
deterritorialization is accompanied by simultaneous reterritorialization or, in Raffestin’s 
shorthand, “TDR,” for “territorialization, deterritorialization, reterritorialization.”166  
This chapter takes a similar approach to the double-becoming of the Chinese territorial 
assemblage and the spatial dimensions of capitalism in Hong Kong. In the last chapter, I argued 
that the PRC reorganized Shenzhen as a “special economic zone” in 1978 to learn from the 
British in nearby Hong Kong how to develop a successful industrial and commercial territory on 
mainland China. I also pointed out that Hong Kong was the last and most economically 
successful colony to leave the British Empire, and unique as the only territory to decolonize 
without gaining independence. In this chapter, I explore the strategies China uses at the 
international scale to prevent Hong Kong and Taiwan from exercising independent self-rule. 
Against the popular narratives of Deng’s cunning manipulation of internal law or a naturally 
declining British Empire, I argue that the initial territorialization of Hong Kong was accidental 
and began with bureaucratic misjudgment and mistranslation. The next section explores the 
limits of the “one country, n systems” arrangement by examining the deterritorialization of the 
Kowloon Walled City, a densely populated settlement that British colonial administrators tore 
down just before the transferring control of Hong Kong to China. I argue that despite being a 
microcosm of British colonial rule, the sub-imperial Kowloon Walled City threatened China’s 
successful reterritorialization of Hong Kong as its new colonial and capitalist administrator. 
Finally, the chapter considers how China’s replacement of the Walled City with a traditional 
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Qing dynasty garden works to “overcode” alternative productions of territory and culture. These 
examples show that the value of Hong Kong, which Lin alluded to in his teapot allegory, is less 
industrial or financial and more the accumulation of British colonial governance capacities which 
the PRC now hopes to incorporate into the Chinese territorial assemblage. 
 
Developing Collaborative Colonial Capacities 
 Chinese and European historians have tended to describe Chinese politics end of the 19th 
century as a clash between the archaic and isolationist Qing dynasty and European competition 
for new territorial holdings. In Harvey’s language, Chinese politics was a Chinese “spatial fix” to 
industrial capitalism’s insatiable need for new consumer markets. In recent years, however, 
critical historians and cultural theorists have begun challenging this narrative by highlighting the 
active collaboration between the Qing, European imperialists, and Chinese traders. John M. 
Carrol has argued that Hong Kong was created by two flows of migrants from Europe and China 
in the space between the British and Qing empires, and points out that Hong Kong has always 
been heavily dependent on mainland China for labor, water, and food.167 Similarly, Law Wing 
Sang has carefully recovered the history of what he calls “collaborative colonialism” in Hong 
Kong between British colonial administrators and local Chinese elites who had established 
European trade relations in tea, silk, and porcelain long before Hong Kong became the key node 
for the opium and coolie trade networks.168 In addition to these interdependent relationships and 
flows, the idea that the tianxia world order or the Qing dynasty collapsed when it came into 
contact with Western imperialists is further complicated by the role played by Europeans in the 
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several domestic “rebellions” in China following the 1841 Treaty of Nanking and the tendency 
for those uprisings to spill over into Hong Kong.  
The Zongli Yamen tried to incorporate Western military technologies and governance 
methods into the Qing administrative hierarchy as a means of increasing China’s capacity to 
resist further European colonization. The Zongli Yamen’s translation of foreign language texts, 
as noted in the last chapter, incorporated Westphalian capacities of international law and modern 
European warfare into the Chinese territorial assemblage which helped the Qing administrative 
hierarchy keep Prussian and other foreign ships out of China’s territorial waters. Despite having 
some success limiting European colonization, the Zongli Yamen’s reforms proved less useful for 
holding China’s domestic territories together under the Qing. A decade after losing Hong Kong 
to the British in 1841, the Qing lost control of several southern territories along the Yangtze 
River, including most of Guangxi and Jiangxi provinces, for nearly 13 years during the Taiping 
Rebellion. The Qing also lost the northern provinces of Jiangsu and Hunan for almost 17 years 
during the Nian Rebellion. Unable to guarantee the safety of tributary missions through 
territories held by the Taiping, or perhaps fearing the Nguyen Emperor would pay tribute to the 
self-proclaimed Taiping “King of Heaven” Hong Xiuquan instead, the Qing also suspended 
tributary missions from Vietnam and Thailand.169 The Taiping and separatist movement of 
Muslim Hui in western Yunnan were only defeated after the two most prominent administrators 
of the Self-Strengthening movement, Zeng Guofan and his student Li Hongzhang, purchased 
guns and cannon from Europeans at an exorbitant price and trained a New Army (yongying). 
Zeng and Li also recruited Western military experts to train and lead the New Army like the 
American officer Frederick Townsend Ward and later British commander Charles George 
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Gordon.170 Zeng and Li defeated the Taiping, but the Qing were never able to reestablish the 
control they once had over the southern territories.  
The late Chinese historian Luo Ergang and China scholar Franz Michael have argued that 
Zeng and Li’s organization of the New Army conditioned the possibility for the private armies of 
the 20th-century warlords.171 More recent historians have discounted the direct line from the New 
Armies to the later warlords drawn by Luo and Michael.172 However, Zeng and Li’s organization 
of the New Army in their home regions, their personalization of military power by appointing 
generals to govern former Taiping territories, and their financing of the New Army by taxing the 
regions they occupied do show that Zeng and Li had created what Michael calls “regional 
armies” which “provided their leaders with bases of autonomous power.”173 European powers, 
high-level members of the Chinese administrative hierarchy like Zeng and Li, local governors, 
and China traders personally benefitted from this arrangement and collaborated to prop up the 
Qing dynasty rather than undermine it. Their collaborations lasted on the mainland until 
prominent members of the Chinese administrative hierarchy, including the Empress Dowager 
Cixi at the top, lent their support to the Boxer Rebellion. The anti-European and anti-colonial 
Boxer Rebellion also spilled over into Hong Kong, inspiring the nationalist texts by Sun Yat-sen 
which stirred members the New Army in Wuchang to attack their Governor-General and launch 
the Xinhai Revolution, finally dissolving what was left of the Qing territorial assemblage.  
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Hong Kong Chinese were excited by the overthrow of the Qing and installation of Sun 
Yat-sen as the first president of the new Republic of China, but the Xinhai Revolution did not 
spread to an overthrow the British or move the colony towards a more representative form of 
government. The Boxer Rebellion sparked a wave of peasant emigration from the mainland but, 
immediately after the Xinhai Revolution, it was former Qing officials who left the mainland for 
Hong Kong as refugees. Colonial police discovered factories for making bombs and a young 
Chinese man tried in 1912 to assassinate the new Hong Kong governor, but civil unrest was 
confined to the lower classes in Hong Kong and the failed assassin did not seem to have political 
motivations.174 Chinese elites supported the revolution but collaborated with colonial officials to 
make sure political unrest did not jeopardize Hong Kong’s economy by, for example, helping 
enforce the Seditions Publications Ordinance of 1914 against the spread of publications that 
might threaten the stability of Hong Kong and China.175  
Most Chinese in Hong Kong quickly lost their enthusiasm for the revolution as it became 
increasingly clear that the young republic could not hold China together as a durable territorial 
assemblage. The former commander of the 1st New Army, Yuan Shikai, deposed President Sun 
in 1912, disbanded the provincial assemblies, and assassinated the Nationalist Party leader to 
prevent a second republican revolution. An American political scientist in China serving as a 
constitutional adviser for the ROC, Frank Johnson Goodnow, persuaded Yuan that the Chinese 
people were not mature enough for democracy and convinced Yuan to declare himself the new 
Emperor of China.176 Yuan only lived another year after his 1915 declaration, but by then Yuan 
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was only one of many warlords trying to reassemble a politically and territorially fragmented 
China. Hong Kong Chinese were annoyed by the constant migration of poor refugees escaping 
the mainland’s political turmoil, but the most sustained moment of anti-British social unrest only 
came after the colonial government responded to the depreciation of Chinese currency flowing 
into Hong Kong from Guangdong by banning the circulation of Chinese coins. The shortage of 
Hong Kong coins meant that many Chinese were suddenly unable to pay ferry or tramway fares 
in the territory and a colony-wide boycott broke out. The colony’s new governor, Francis Henry 
May, encouraged prominent members of the Chinese community to help end the boycott citing 
the harm it would do to British and Chinese capital investments in the tram companies but was 
annoyed at how little influence these elites had over Hong Kong Chinese.177  
May’s complaint was common among governors accustomed to the dual administration 
of other Crown Colonies like those in India. In the British Raj, for example, the governor, 
assisted by an executive and legislative council, controlled colonial territories by assimilating the 
existing class of local elites into the machinery of colonial administration and forming subsidiary 
alliances with vassal rulers of the Princely States. This arrangement might have worked in Hong 
Kong considering that in rural China the elite or gentry traditionally served as intermediaries 
between government and local people. As mentioned in the last chapter, the Qin and Han 
dynasties assimilated local elites into the administrative hierarchy through the meritocratic 
imperial examination systems. When the British first occupied Hong Kong, however, the natives 
and the few gentry living on the island refused to cooperate with the colonial administration and 
lodged a joint petition to the Qing provincial governor asking for protection from the barbarian 
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invaders.178 The British planned to colonize Hong Kong as they had other recently acquired 
territories but soon discovered that most of Chinese on the island were male immigrants with no 
attachments to local villages and there were too few village elders for the British to coopt a base 
of authority. The farmers in Hong Kong had produced no scholars for the imperial examinations 
and the local fisherman did not have kin ties to the gentry class in the administrative hierarchy of 
nearby Xin’an County.179 The typical British approach to colonization by collaborating with local 
elites was further complicated when the native villages were overrun by a large wave of 
immigrants from the mainland at the end of the First Opium War.  
The British search for local elites to coopt was also complicated by the Qing’s policies 
towards any Chinese willing to emigrate and live under foreign colonial rule in a territory that 
had been taken from China. The Qing barred emigres from routes to social advancement like the 
civil service examinations and treated overseas Chinese as pirates, criminals, traitors, and 
deserters. In the early 1800s, for example the island was headquarters of an infamous pirate, 
Zhang Baozi, who controlled what would later be named Victoria Peak as a useful lookout point 
for spotting ships to raid.180 According to Carroll, these policies are not just another example of 
Qing xenophobia, but a strategy to “prevent links between merchants and overseas Chinese that 
might lead to anti-Manchu factions, and to prevent collusion between seditious native and 
foreigners.”181 The British could not, therefore, build relationships with Hong Kong Chinese by 
co-opting members of an established gentry class as they had done in other colonial territories. 
Instead, the “colonial government kept almost autocratic power in the hands of the governor; 
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Chinese residents were subjected to crude coercive measures such as nightly curfew, elaborate 
registration schemes, and other surveillance and policing practices.”182 As a result, Hong Kong 
became organized under a mutually practiced racial-spatial segregation of the territory. The 
colonial government, like the Qing, assumed Chinese in Hong Kong were criminals and 
surveilled their movements with laws like the 1888 Light and Pass Ordinance which required 
Chinese to carry a lamp when traveling at night.183 The Hong Kong government also passed 
zoning regulations to reserve prime waterfront properties and later Victoria Peak or “Little 
England” for Europeans residents and concentrated Chinese in the exclusive “Chinatown” zone 
near Tai Ping Shan. This segregation of Chinese and Europeans and the lack of traditional elites 
that could be co-opted by the British conditioned the possibility of a new form of colonial 
governance for Hong Kong. 
Europeans had long depended on Chinese business networks in Asia and after the Qing 
outlawed the sale of opium, the British became even more dependent on Chinese merchants and 
smugglers. Many of these merchants, declared criminals by the Qing, collaborated with the 
British during the Opium Wars by supplying the Royal Navy and acting as spies. The British 
relied so heavily on these Chinese merchants that the British superintendent of trade, Captain 
Charles Elliot, defended the colonization of Hong Kong in 1841 by calling it “an act of justice 
and protection to the native population upon whom we have been so long dependent for 
assistance and supply.”184 As the population of Hong Kong increased, the colony became even 
more dependent on these merchants to supply Hong Kong with a reliable flow of food and water 
from the mainland. This small group of Chinese war collaborators became wealthy by supplying 
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the colony with food and water, intermediating the opium and later coolie trades, and from land 
grants on Hong Kong awarded to them by the British. The concentration of Chinese in 
Chinatown allowed this new class of merchant elites to establish themselves as local leaders 
independent of British colonial administration. British colonial administrators encouraged the 
development of these elites and their unofficial governing institutions like the Tung Wah 
Hospital and Po Leung Kuk Society for the Protection of Women and Children to address 
“Chinese” matters in the “Chinese” way.185  
Officially the territory was managed by a governor, Executive Council (ExCo), 
Legislative Council (LegCo), and colonial civil servants who were largely drawn from the 
British middle class.186 The merchants co-opted to help govern Hong Kong Chinese and the 
Chinatown territory were, by contrast, wealthy permanent residents with long-term business and 
social investment in the success of the colony. These “unofficials” maintained closer 
relationships with local Chinese than their British LegCo counterparts, but they had few links to 
underprivileged Chinese or recent immigrants and tended to represent the interests of the 
business and professional classes from which they were drawn.187 The territory was ostensibly 
organized around the principle of “laissez-faire” with minimal government interference in the 
“free trade” of Hong Kong’s “free port.” However, British colonial control over the territory 
depended on discriminatory monopolies which favored British firms like the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank, the Swire Group, and Jardine and Matheson by granting their executives seats on 
the ExCo and LegCo.188 Since the state owned all of the land, British colonial administrators also 
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maintained the elite status and authority of Chinese unofficials by overrepresenting their interests 
in property sales, land leases, and the local housing market.189 Underprivileged and recent 
Chinese immigrants did not passively accept their strategic exclusion from governmental 
representation and discriminatory racial-spatial segregation by colonial administrators in Hong 
Kong. Recent immigrants also drew on their own relationships in mainland China to resist 
British colonial rule.  
A decade after the 1912 tramway boycott mentioned earlier, for example, Chinese 
seamen went on strike against British and Chinese businessmen who paid them less than 
Europeans for the same work. Backed and organized by Sun’s Nationalist Party on the mainland, 
strikers left Hong Kong for Canton (now Guangzhou) and were soon followed by a stream of 
domestic servants, engineers, and coolies who joined the strike for the same reason. The Hong 
Kong colonial government tried to prevent the flow of labor out of the territory and interruptions 
to the flow to trade through Hong Kong ports by declaring the strike illegal and sent police and 
troops to block further emigration. Indian colonial troops opened fire on a large crowd and killed 
five Chinese workers, intensifying the movement and finally forcing the colonial government 
and shipping companies to meet the workers’ demands.190 Another strike a few years later led by 
the new Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai turned into an anti-imperialist demonstration that 
quickly spread to Hong Kong when workers employed by foreign firms joined the mainland 
strikers to organize a boycott of all British goods and shipments. The 1925 Guangzhou–Hong 
Kong general strike paralyzed Hong Kong’s economy, but dissolved when Sun suddenly died, 
Chiang Kai-shek confiscated the strikers’ weapons, and arrested the strike leaders.191 As these 
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incidents demonstrate, Hong Kong could only be called laissez-faire by ignoring this history of 
British colonial domination and Chinese resistance. 
The United Kingdom’s strategy of territorial management in Hong Kong was therefore 
spatially segregated by race and undemocratically governed by a British class of career civil 
servants and local Chinese elites. Law provides an abundance of evidence to support his 
conclusion that the British and local Chinese elites engaged in a collaborative form of 
colonization, but they were also instrumental in bringing Chinese capacities of territorial 
governance into the British colonial administration. During the same period the Qing were losing 
control of Chinese territories, the British were sponsoring the development of a new gentry class 
in Hong Kong who modeled themselves on the Qing administrative hierarchy. Elite Hong Kong 
Chinese began wearing the costume of Qing Mandarin administrators and invited the British 
governor to social events to reinforce, as Law puts it, “the perception of the continuity of sheer 
imperial power, whether British or Qing.”192 Some of these new Hong Kong elites also received 
Qing titles and official recognition from the emperor after raising money for flood and famine 
relief in China. The British organized Hong Kong into a Crown Colony that was clearly and 
geographically centered on London, but local Chinese elites subverted the tianxia territorial 
strategy of controlling local gentry through meritocratic competition over mastery of the Chinese 
classics. Instead, local Chinese elites in Hong Kong gained social status with the Qing and 
unofficial administrative authority through the imperial power of the British monarchy. Later, as 
Gavin Ure points out, these unofficials gained nearly autonomous power in the colonial 
government over appropriations when Governor Stubb appointed them to the Finance Committee 
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in 1920.193 British administrators and local Chinese elites developed institutional capacities that 
contributed to a durable colonial assemblage that was easy to reassemble after the WWII 
Japanese occupation of Hong Kong.  
The PRC’s interest in Hong Kong has not been just about winning a patriotic debate over 
the right of territorial naming as Tok concludes.194 Carroll also rejects the assertion that China 
was eager to acquire Hong Kong for its industrial and financial institutions by pointing out that 
British investment in Hong Kong in the 1960s was less than half what it had been in the 1930s 
and the British Treasury calculated in 1976 that Hong Kong was no longer an economic asset for 
Great Britain.195 Instead, following Law, the patriotic value of Hong Kong lies in the territory’s 
“ability to teach its coming ruler all about Hong Kong’s colonial rule”196 or in other words the 
collaborative and institutional capacities holding Hong Kong together as a durable colonial 
assemblage. The tianxia territorial assemblage made China the central empire, but the modern 
nation-state international system relegated China to the periphery and the efforts to modernize 
China through Self-Strengthening or Mao’s Great Leap Forward had ended in disaster. Li’s 
teapot allegory was a warning to hardline nationalists against reproducing the PRC institutions of 
economic and urban planning institutions in Hong Kong. Ever since the Sino-Soviet split, and 
especially after the U.S.-led embargo of China in 1950, Hong Kong had served as China’s 
connection to Western modernity as it struggled to develop under socialist principles. For 
reformers like Li and Deng, cleansing Hong Kong of its accumulated colonial capacities would 
destroy the possibility of modernizing China through Western-style colonization that had, for the 
                                                     
193 Ure, Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-58, 25. 
194 Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 172. 
195 Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, 179. 
196 Law, Collaborative Colonial Power, 175. 
83 
 
most part, been recognized as legitimate by the post-WWII international community. However, 
before China could learn from Hong Kong how to assemble successful colonial territories, it had 
to prevent Hong Kong from decolonizing and gaining independence as most other former British 
colonies had done. China’s acquisition of Hong Kong was far from inevitable and might never 
have happened if it were not for a series of accidents. 
 
Territorializing and Reterritorializing Hong Kong 
 The majority of articles and books written about the 1997 Transfer of Sovereignty are 
focused on whether China could successfully manage Hong Kong after the British or would 
China respect the liberal rights Hong Kong residents had enjoyed under colonial rule. A large 
portion of the existing literature has therefore focused on what Chinese, British, and Hong Kong 
government officials have said about their policy decisions and intentions. Most of this literature 
begins by recounting the death of Mao and Deng’s subsequent consolidation of power before 
inviting the Governor of Hong Kong to Beijing for the first time to discuss the territory’s future. 
At this meeting, Deng is supposed to have signaled that he expected Hong Kong to be returned to 
China in 1997 when the 99-year lease to Great Britain expired and reassured Governor 
MacLehose that the PRC would allow capitalism to continue in the territory. The day after his 
return from Beijing, MacLehose told the press Deng requested he “ask investors in Hong Kong 
to put their hearts at ease” and later emphasized the “moral obligations” of Great Britain to honor 
the lease 1898 Second Convention of Peking as responsible participants in the international 
community.197 Chinese and Western news media has since described Deng as a “political wizard” 
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for his skillful application of international legal norms and his willingness to accommodate 
capitalism in Hong Kong and the new special economic zones on mainland China.198 However, 
by relying on the official statements and press releases, IR and China scholars have missed the 
important role of mistranslations, accidents, and predictions made after the fact in these 
apparently rational processes of political negotiation. 
 In the last chapter, I noted that few government or high-ranking Party officials in China 
before 1978 expressed any interest in gaining control over Hong Kong. Neither the PRC or ROC 
had made any overt moves to block Britain’s resumption of control over Hong Kong after the 
Japanese withdrew following WWII. In fact, in 1972 the PRC asked the United Nations to 
remove Hong Kong from its list of colonial territories and in 1976 the PRC declined Portugal’s 
offer to return Macau.199 In 1977, the senior PRC official responsible for Hong Kong affairs also 
made it clear that China was not interested in changing Hong Kong’s status until after the 
question of Taiwan control was resolved.200 British diplomats, overseas Chinese, and many IR 
scholars and practitioners believed these statements signaled that China would also decline to 
make future claims on Hong Kong. 
There was also serious question as to whether Hong Kong and Kowloon should be 
included in any potential return to China. The 1842 Treaty of Nanking and 1860 Treaty of 
Peking had ceded Hong Kong island and Kowloon to Great Britain “in perpetuity.” The 1989 
Second Convention of Peking had only named the New Territories as the land leased for 99-
years to Great Britain. Furthermore, the treaty signed after the Second Convention of Peking was 
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made between “The United Kingdom and China” or “the Governments of Great Britain and 
China.” In the 1970s, Great Britain, the UN, and most countries recognized the ROC, not the 
PRC, as the sole legitimate government of China.201 Any “retrocession” after the 99-year lease 
should, therefore, have returned the New Territories to the ROC government in Taiwan. 
The motivation for a reunification with China seems to have originated in Hong Kong, 
not in China or with Deng, as the financial sector administered by elite Chinese unofficials began 
raising concerns about their future returns on property investments in the New Territories.202 
Their individual land leases, or “Crown Leases,” were due to expire three days before the New 
Territories lease to Great Britain. Hong Kong banks, for example, offered residents a standard 
fifteen-year mortgage package and by 1978 were beginning to panic about making new loans if 
the Crown Leases were not going to be renewed after 1997.203 Deng invited Governor 
MacLehose to meet with him in Beijing to discuss the future of Hong Kong, but not its return to 
China. Deng wanted to discuss how China and Great Britain might work together to control the 
massive flow of legal and illegal immigrants to Hong Kong by improving the conditions in 
Guangdong with foreign investments.204 Steve Tsang’s careful reconstruction of events using 
recently declassified records shows that Governor MacLehose secretly took it upon himself to 
discuss the financial investors’ concerns over the Crown Leases with Deng at this meeting 
without consulting London, any of his staff except for one aid, or any of the people in the New 
Territories whose futures he was deciding.205 MacLehose and British policymakers took the 
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stated lack of interest in recovering Hong Kong from PRC leaders to mean that Deng was 
planning to extend the 99-year New Territories lease in exchange for other concessions.  
China had never recognized the legitimacy of the “unequal treaties” ceding Hong Kong 
island, Kowloon, and the New Territories to Great Britain. When the discussion between Deng 
and MacLehose turned to Hong Kong, Deng repeated China’s familiar general claim to 
sovereignty over the “lost territories.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry had asked MacLehose not 
to bring up the Crown Leases, and Deng had not been briefed on them, and neither the British 
nor Chinese diplomats had prepared to discuss any leases. MacLehose, however, took Deng’s 
general statement of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong as an opening to raise the question of 
the Crown Leases, surprising and confusing the translator who mistakenly told Deng that 
MacLehose wanted to discuss the New Territories lease. MacLehose’s diplomatic aid tried to 
correct the translator, but a visibly surprised and annoyed Deng simply repeated his statement 
that China had sovereignty over Hong Kong.206 Following PRC conventions, “once the most 
senior leader has spoken, no one contradicts him”207 and the Chinese territorialization of Hong 
Kong became official policy. The incorporation of Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New 
Territories into the Chinese territorial assemblage was not inevitable or the result of strategic 
manipulations of international legal norms by clever politicians. Institutional capacities and 
diplomatic negotiations would be called upon later to prepare Hong Kong for the Transfer of 
Sovereignty, but the initial territorialization of Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories by 
China was the result of a mistranslation and PRC diplomatic conventions. 
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In 1982, Prime Minister Thatcher visited Beijing to probe whether there was any change 
in the PRC’s decision, but the Chinese diplomats only repeated Deng earlier statement and the 
meeting turned from the question of whether China would take control of Hong Kong to 
questions of how and when it would happen. Thatcher’s visit resulted in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration which began by declaring that the desire “to recover the Hong Kong area (including 
Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is 
the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people.”208 This “common aspiration,” Deng’s 
clever political maneuverings, and the British commitment to honoring international agreements 
were invented after the fact to naturalize the inevitable territorialization of Hong Kong by the 
PRC. Had MacLehose had not misjudged the situation, the translator not made a mistake, and 
Deng been prepared then Hong Kong might have remained under British control or followed all 
the other Crown Colonies after WWII and become independent. 
Once China was committed to taking control over the Hong Kong territories, it began 
collaborating with London, the Hong Kong colonial government, and the Hong Kong Chinese 
unofficials. China quickly began co-opting the support of business leaders, trade unions, 
professional associations, and foreign investors. PRC leaders inviting them to Beijing and 
promised that in return for the patriotic support of PRC control over Hong Kong they would have 
greater access to the formal machinery of government and make more money than they had 
under the British.209 The National People’s Congress went so far as to put several Hong Kong 
unofficials on the committee tasked with drafting a new constitution that would govern the 
territory after 1997. The Drafting Committee included PRC and Hong Kong government 
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officials, but it was dominated by Hong Kong businessmen.210 The similarity of the new 
constitutional government they drafted to the Hong Kong colonial government and the continuity 
of everyday life for Hong Kong residents after 1997 has since been the subject of numerous 
commentaries. Gregory Chu, for example, asserted that “one thing has been altered: all the red 
mailboxes on the streets have been painted green just as a symbol to remind people that the 
Chinese are now in charge!”211 However, less attention has been paid to the processes of British 
deterritorialization and Chinese reterritorialization the Joint Declaration and Basic Law 
anticipated. 
In his study of contemporary territoriality in the Middle East, Hazbun cites numerous 
examples of decolonization being followed with an immediate recolonization by local elites, 
foreign business interests, and foreign state institutions. Hazbun uses Deleuze and Guattari to 
avoid the reductive rise and fall account of a territory and argues for an active understanding of 
territoriality as a continual process by which every act of deterritorialization is accompanied by 
new acts of reterritorialization. Hazbun describes reterritorialization as the “processes or policies 
that decrease the saliency of boundaries, distance, and territorial specificities as means of 
regulations, control, and identification.”212 In the case of Hong Kong, China reterritorialized 
British citizens, putting them into circulation the way Deleuze and Guattari explained peasants’ 
labor power and capitalism, by making it impossible for them to work in Hong Kong without a 
visa and encouraging British (now foreigners) to leave. China replaced all the flags flown at 
public offices with flags of the PRC and Hong Kong SAR, replaced all references to the 
“Crown” in laws and ordinances with the “State,” renamed the “Supreme Court” with the “High 
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Court,” replaced the office of the Governor with the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and 
repainted Royal Mail pillar boxes with green Hong Kong Post. Uniformed officers kept their 
British uniforms but were required to change their cap badges and all other British insignia.213 
The new Chinese order, as Stephen Vines argues, was “so keen to remove symbols of the past, 
has been equally keen to restore the past in the shape of recreating an abandoned form of 
colonial government.”214 China reterritorialized Hong Kong’s social capital as well. 
PRC leaders have frequently referred to the return of Hong Kong as an end to China’s 
“century of humiliation” and argued that the lack of serious resistance to the handover shows that 
the PRC has entered a new era of improved international relations, commitment to rapid 
economic growth, and less economic or social control. According to Carroll, the 
reterritorialization of Hong Kong was a “chance to prove to the world, especially to Taiwan, that 
China was sincere about the one country, two systems” territorial arrangement.215 However, more 
recent events like the “Occupy Central” and “Umbrella Movement” opposing the CCP’s pre-
selection of Chief Executive candidates before general elections show that China’s 
reterritorialization of Hong Kong has also generated resistance.216 However, the British and their 
elite Chinese collaborators actively worked to suppress democratic movements during the 
colonial period and only began opening a handful of government offices to elections when it 
became clear in 1984 that Hong Kong would soon be under China’s control. Since 1997, China 
has done its best to continue the British tactics of delaying democratic reforms and ensuring that 
the interests of the PRC and their elite Hong Kong Chinese collaborators are well represented. 
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China has also been willing to employ more violent tactics to suppress democratic reforms and 
reassert its exclusive territorial control in Hong Kong. The last chapter takes up Tok’s 
formulation of contemporary Chinese territoriality as “one country, n systems” 217 where n 
represents the potentially unlimited variability of territorial arrangements China can successfully 
accommodate. However, the deterritorialization of Taiwan and the collaborative destruction of 
the Kowloon Walled City expose limits to the Chinese territorial assemblage’s flexibility.  
 
Chinese Deterritorializations and Tianxia Cultural Governance 
Hong Kong and Taiwan both developed separately from communist China and have their 
own international relations, but now that Hong Kong’s territorial status is no longer in question, 
China has shown little interest in controlling its participation in international organizations and 
has even encouraged the HKSAR to form new relations independent of the PRC. The PRC’s 
battle with the ROC began as a civil war over the control of Chinese territory, but the contest has 
been transformed into a dispute over Taiwan’s independence from mainland China in 
international politics. During the Cold War, Taiwan was useful to the U.S. policy of communist 
containment in Asia as it was the only country to rapidly industrialize while also peacefully 
transitioning from a military dictatorship into a liberal democratic state. However, after Richard 
Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 and the subsequent normalization of U.S.-China relations in 
1979, the ROC has had to bargain with the PRC for participation in formal international 
associations like the World Health Organization and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.218 
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The accidental decision to acquire Hong Kong gave the PRC an opportunity to plug British 
collaborative colonial capacities into the Chinese territorial assemblage and prove that Taiwan 
does not need independence to continue under China’s control as a liberal democracy with a 
capitalist economy. 
China also prevents Taiwanese independence by deploying a “fleet in being” strategy or 
what Deleuze and Guattari, quoting Paul Virilio, call a “vector of deterritorialization” to control 
the ROC’s international relationships.219 Deleuze and Guattari describe this strategy as 
developing from Western naval tactics in which “the sea became the place of fleet in being, 
where one no longer goes from one point to another, but rather holds space beginning from any 
point: instead of striating space, one occupies it with a vector of deterritorialization in perpetual 
motion.”220 China rarely attempts to influence Taiwan’s domestic affairs, but continually 
deterritorializes Taiwan’s international spaces to prevent the “renegade province”221 from 
managing its international relations as an independent nation-state. The PRC offers Taiwan 
greater domestic autonomy than Hong Kong in its “one country, two systems” arrangement and 
presents unification with China as Taiwan’s only means of autonomously controlling its 
international spaces. 
China’s deterritorialization of the Kowloon Walled City shows that China’s “one country, 
two systems” territorial arrangement does not always scale down. After the British took Hong 
Kong, the Qing began building the Walled City by fortifying a small Song dynasty customs 
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station in the northeast corner of the Kowloon peninsula. The Qing administrative hierarchy 
transferred the chief military officer of Xin’an County seat to the fort, increased the garrison by 
150 additional troops, and constructed a wall with mounted cannon around the fort’s six acres.222 
The new Walled City was primarily a garrison town with a small civilian population of 200 
military dependents. The residents built a small school and a modern provincial customs station 
inside the walls and a marketplace sprang up outside to keep the city supplied.223 The first 
invaders of the Walled City came from colonial Hong Kong island but were, ironically, Chinese 
members of the Taiping uprising and Kowloon officials escaped the Taiping by fleeing to Hong 
Kong. The Qing eventually retook the fort and it became something of a tourist attraction for 
European visitors, first as a place to take photos of “a little bit of Old China” and later for 
gambling and prostitution after the British prohibited both activities on Hong Kong island.224 
When the British invaded Kowloon and forced the Qing to cede the peninsula to them in 1860, 
the Anglo-Chinese boundary was set a few hundred yards from the fort to keep it within Chinese 
territorial control. The Second Convention of Peking in 1898 engulfed the Walled City with 
British controlled New Territories surrounding the small plot of land. Qing administrators 
negotiating the 99-year lease insisted that the Walled City not be counted as part of the New 
Territories but, a year after agreeing, the British expelled all Chinese officials from the fort and 
declared it part of their colony. Some of the original civilian population continued living in the 
decaying Walled City as the surrounding areas in Kowloon began developing into an urban city. 
Both the Qing and the British colonial administrations claimed jurisdiction over the Walled City, 
but neither wanted to take responsibility for its residents or open the possibility for diplomatic 
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incidents by exercising institutional control over the territory. The result, as historian Elizabeth 
Sinn describes, “was a near vacuum of administrative function and authority” within the Walled 
City.225  
The British made several attempts to raze the Walled City between 1933 and 1948, but 
the ROC continued claiming the territory and helped its Chinese residents and squatters to 
organize against eviction.226 When the Japanese occupied Hong Kong, they tore down the City’s 
wall and used it to extend the nearby Kai Tak Airport. After WWII, refugees from mainland 
China flowed into the City and replaced the old squatters’ huts with concrete high-rise buildings. 
The British made several more unsuccessful attempts to evacuate and knock down the settlement 
citing hygiene and criminal threats the City posed to the surrounding territory. Seth Harter points 
out that the “vice discourse” used by the Hong Kong colonial administration: 
focused on the prostitutes who lived in the city rather than their clients and the 
pimps who usually came from the outside; they focused on the addicts who slept 
in the city’s alleys, while masking the suppliers who brought drugs into the city; 
and they focused on the employees who ran the gambling operations in the city 
rather than on the punters who brought their stakes in from the surrounding 
neighborhoods or the triad bosses who took the profits back out of the city.227 
In other words, Hong Kong colonial administrators defined the Walled City as an isolated 
territory characterized by crime in contrast to the law and order of British colonial rule. In 
actuality, crime rates were no higher within the Walled City than in the rest of Hong Kong and 
the New Territories.228 The 33,000 people living on a six-acre plot of land with factories, schools, 
food courts, brothels, opium dens, casinos, and many unlicensed dentists made the Walled City 
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the most densely populated territory on Earth.229 The seven to fifteen story buildings of the City 
evaded the ten-story limit enforced by Hong Kong’s building codes and landlords did not pay 
property taxes, making an apartment in the City one third to one half below the cost of rent in 
neighborhoods nearby with easy access to public transportation.230 Western and Chinese 
researchers seem to determine whether the Kowloon Walled City was an extreme space of 
laissez-faire capitalism where anything could be bought and sold without state regulation or a 
haven for recent immigrants from communist China and the working poor against the brutal 
capitalist competition of Hong Kong’s real estate market and currency speculation.  
In many ways, the Walled City might better be described as a small-scale version of 
British collaborative colonization in the Hong Kong territories. The Walled City, which no 
longer had a wall, was far from isolated or self-sufficient. Like Hong Kong, it depended on a 
continual flow of food, water, capital, people, and goods into and out of the territory. Many 
residents worked in Hong Kong and many who lived in Hong Kong worked in one of the Walled 
City’s fishball and noodle factories or metalworking shops and textile mills. However, China and 
Hong Kong regularly disrupted these flows as tensions over territorial control prevented the 
colonial government from plugging the Walled City into Hong Kong’s water mains. The Hong 
Kong Urban Service entered the City several times a day to sterilize public water wells and Triad 
organized crime rings tapped into the surrounding water mains to run hoses or pipes illegally into 
the City.231 Eventually, longtime residents, business owners, and Triad bosses organized a 
neighborhood welfare association (Kaifong) to negotiate for improvements to the water and 
drainage situation. The Kaifong collaborated with the Hong Kong city police and other British 
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administrators just as the Hong Kong unofficials did in the surrounding colony. As described 
earlier, local Chinese elites in Hong Kong developed their social capital and recognition from the 
Qing emperor by raising money for famine relief in China. In 1984, the Walled City business 
leaders also organized a fund for famine victims in Ethiopia, similarly transforming themselves 
from criminals to respectable businessmen with international recognition.232 However, when it 
came time to begin preparing Hong Kong for the Transfer of Sovereignty to China, the 
collaborative colonial capacities of the Kowloon Walled City were not incorporated into the “one 
country, two systems” territorial arrangement. 
The Joint Declaration made it clear that Great Britain would turn over control of Hong 
Kong to China in 1997 and that China would not object to the British exercising control over the 
Walled City before then. According to Harter, “Equally clear, if unspoken, was the 
understanding that China found it embarrassing to have to come to the defense of the Walled 
City in the name of patriotism and would be happy if the colonial authorities were able to 
eradicate it before the retrocession.”233 The Walled City also presented a problem for China 
because the PRC had long used the City as a prime example of the squalor and brutal conditions 
capitalism and foreign colonial rule had forced upon Hong Kong.234 China had failed to defend 
Hong Kong against Great Britain during the Opium Wars, and then the ROC and PRC failed to 
liberate the territory from the violence of colonization and capitalism. As China began preparing 
to incorporate the British capacities of collaborative colonization and a globalized capitalist 
economy into the Chinese territorial assemblage, China could not accommodate the ability of 
immigrants and City residents to produce territory along what Deleuze and Guattari called the 
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smooth “nomadic trajectory” to distribute “people (or animals) in open space.”235 Furthermore, 
opposition to earlier attempts by the British to demolish the Walled City had generated a shared 
identity and strong sense of loyalty among residents. China discovered that its deterritorialization 
of Hong Kong as a foreign colony was generating a similar share Hongkongese identity and 
sense of loyalty to the city. After the PRC’s brutal repression in 1989 of student protesters in 
Tiananmen Square, Hongkongers became even more assertive in claiming a hybrid East-West 
identity and began threatening China’s reterritorialization of Hong Kong as an integral part of the 
Chinese motherland and Chinese nation. The Walled City was a problem for China. 
British and Chinese administrators collaborated in secret talks to solve the problem of the 
Kowloon Walled City for two years. At 9:00am on January 14, 1987 the PRC and Hong Kong 
colonial government simultaneously announced that the Walled City would be torn down. At the 
exact same moment, 1,200 bureaucrats from the Hong Kong government’s Survey and Mapping 
Department accompanied by policemen swept through the City to count the occupants, owners, 
and size of all property.236 The Hong Kong government began evicting the City’s residents and 
allocated HK$2.7 billion in compensation for their property, territorializing the City’s industrial 
and social capital before resettling the City’s residents and deterritorializing the city space with 
bulldozers in April 1993.237 Only two years before the handover, the colonial Hong Kong 
administration began building an urban garden where the Walled City had been that was 
modeled on Beijing public parks where the former private alters of the Qing ruling family had 
stood. By turning the Walled City space into an early Qing garden, the Chinese and British 
administrators collaborated to reject any suggestion of an East-West hybridity. In contrast to the 
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deterritorialization of Taiwan, China and its British colonial collaborators replaced the immigrant 
and working poor’s production of territory with a striated state space regulating human flows 
along easily surveilled walkways and invented “Hong Kong’s first authentic Chinese garden.”238  
A year before the Transfer of Sovereignty, the colonial British government and Chinese 
administrative hierarchy collaborated to transform the Walled City into a planned urban space 
where the possibility of alternative identities and colonial capabilities was reduced to a 
homogenous experience of China’s “rejuvenation” (fuxing). The goal of rejuvenation projects 
like the Kowloon Walled City Park, according to Yan Xuetong, is not to simply refer to the 
ancient past but “to restore China’s power status to the prosperity enjoyed during the prime of 
the Han, Tang and early Qing Dynasties.”239 If the park was only meant to refer back to the Qing 
dynasty or China before the “century of humiliation,” however, its designers should have 
modeled it on the Lingnan style of southern China and the gardens in nearby Guangdong. 
Instead, the Chinese and British collaborated to replace the Walled City with a lower Yangtze 
River style garden which, as Harter points out, signals that Hong Kong was being returned to 
“the People’s Republic at large” rather than just its traditional place in China’s administrative 
hierarchy under Guangdong Province.240 The Kowloon Walled City Park reminds visitors of 
Hong Kong before Western colonization and China at the height of its empire, and rejuvenates 
the tianxia territorial organization of the world culturally below and geographically centered on 
the Central Plains of China. Put another way following Shapiro’s reading of Deleuze and 
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Guattari, the Park is a project of tianxia cultural governance which “overcodes” alternative 
encodings of territories and flows of people, things, and capital.241  
Like the larger projects of cultural governance aimed at replacing Hongkongese identity 
with a Chinese national identity, China’s attempt to overcode the shared identity of Kowloon 
Walled City inhabitants has generated resistance. Former Walled City residents and their 
children frequently meet at the Park to loudly complain about their resettlement packages, their 
prospects in the surrounding territory, and the loss of their community.242 Alternative experiences 
of the Walled City have also found their way into a large number of Hong Kong, Chinese, and 
Western films, television programs, and videogames. Versions of the City appear in popular 
films co-produced by the Beijing Film Studio and Hong Kong’s Star Overseas like Steven 
Chow’s Kung Fu Hustle (2004) and Hollywood films like Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) 
and Christopher Nolan’s Batman Begins (2005).243 Recent first-person shooter and role-playing 
videogames like Call of Duty (2010) and Deus Ex: Human Revolution (2011) allow players to 
explore what the City might look like today if it had not been torn down.244 In Japanese popular 
culture, the City has inspired so many anime films and videogames that the Kawasaki 
Warehouse amusement arcade in Tokyo reconstructed a large section of the City. The 
reconstruction includes Chinese rowhouses and intersecting walkways along with minutely 
detailed posters and signs reproduced from photographs taken by survey teams on the day China 
and British administrators announced their plan to demolish the City.245 As Shapiro notes, “at a 
historical moment when a government is seeking support from the arts to extend its sphere of 
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imperial violence…the arts can be mobilized to resist. Its archives remain open to a process in 
which memory can never be constructed as definitive history.”246 China may have dissolved the 
buildings and institutions of the Kowloon Walled City, but its features continue to be 
reassembled in popular media and international spaces far from the Qing garden that replaced it.  
This chapter began by describing the colonial capacities British administrators devised to 
control the Hong Kong territories, focusing especially on the development of collaborative 
colonialism and the cooption of local elites. I argue that these capacities, in combination with the 
radical contingencies of misjudgment and mistranslation, created the conditions of possibility for 
China’s territorialization of Hong Kong and the prevention of continued British colonial rule or 
independence. The chapter then explored the processes of Hong Kong’s reterritorialization and 
incorporation of British colonial capacities into the Chinese territorial assemblage, which I argue 
were more valuable to China than Hong Kong’s industrial or financial institutions. The chapter 
then contrasted China’s fleet in being deterritorialization of Taiwan’s international spaces with 
its deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the Kowloon Walled City. Despite the 
similarities between Hong Kong and the Walled City territories, I find that China could not 
accommodate the City with a “one country, n systems” arrangement without drawing attention to 
its past failure to defend Hong against British colonization and capitalism, and its plan to replace 
Britain as Hong Kong’s new colonizer and warden of its capitalist economy. This case study of 
Chinese territoriality ended by considering how the replacement of the Walled City with an early 
Qing dynasty garden in the Yangtze River style reorients the territory’s flow of people towards 
Chinese culture and a rejuvenation of the tianxia world order. The next chapter explores how the 
tianxia territorial capacities and Hong Kong colonial capacities described in the last two chapters 
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are being reconfigured to build new lands, establish new cities, and control the volumetric spaces 
of the South China Sea as a territory of “Greater China.” 
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Chapter 3 
 
Tacky Territorial Assemblages:  
Building Sansha City in the South China Sea for a “Greater China” 
 
 
Certain islands and reefs that do not need a military presence will be developed 
into key sites on a Maritime Silk Road. We will develop some islands and reefs to 
accommodate a select number of tourists. It will be an orderly and gradual 
procedure. It is not an easy trip, but many people with a patriotic spirit want to 
try. The arrival of tourists will nourish the need for divers and windsurfers. 
—Xiao Jie, Sansha City Mayor247 
 
 
On July 23, 2012, a small group of Chinese government officials, party members, and 
high-ranking officers of the People’s Liberation Army met on the tiny Yongxing Island in the 
Xisha archipelago for a short ceremony. At 10:40 am, a PLA officer planted the Five-star Red 
Flag and the military band played the “March of the Volunteers” Chinese national anthem. A few 
moments later, the PRC Vice Minister of Civil Affairs, Sun Shaochi, announced the State 
Council’s approval to establish Sansha City on the island and unveiled signboards of the Sansha 
Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Sansha Municipal 
Government.248 That afternoon, forty-five deputies of the new Municipal CCP elected Xiao Jie as 
the new mayor of a prefecture-level city with no population and almost no land. Sansha, which 
literally translates as “the three islands,” had the day before been a county-level territory in the 
Chinese administrative hierarchy. Yongxing is the largest island of the Xisha archipelago, but a 
                                                     
247 Li and Liu, “Sansha Seeks to Become Major Tourist Attraction.” 
248 Ji, “创造三沙奇迹 三沙市成立筹备工作纪实 (Creating the Sansha Miracle: Documenting the Establishment of 
Sansha City).” 
105 
 
few months before it only had enough room for a few radio antennas and short airplane runway 
that had been built in the 1990s on top of imported sand that construction crews had dumped on a 
large offshore rock. Today, the Island is big enough to accommodate a PRC administration 
building, a branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, a post office, a hospital, two 
museums, two WWII monuments, a department store, a supermarket, a China National Radio 
broadcasting station, a primary schoolhouse, a barber’s shop, the movie theater referenced in the 
quote above, and a HQ-9 Surface to Air Missile system.249 
 Many IR scholars and practitioners have correctly deduced that China’s “reclamation” 
project to expand Xisha Island and build twenty other artificial islands in the South China Sea 
serves military purposes, but some have gone further to assume those are China’s only 
intentions. One of the most prominent IR scholars, John Mearsheimer, describes China’s island-
building project by asserting that power is the ultimate source of security in an anarchic world 
and predicting that China’s commitment to a “peaceful rise” is only a temporary ruse. According 
to Mearsheimer, China will inevitably model itself on previous empires and acquire future 
territory by armed conflict and economic coercion.250 IR practitioners from the U.S. seem to be 
especially suspicious of China’s actions in the South China Sea. For example, the political 
scientist and China Strategist in the Strategic Studies Group at the Pentagon, Oriana Skylar 
Mastro, argues the establishment of Sansha city “shows that the Chinese leadership is 
deliberately escalating its coercive diplomacy” towards the other countries claiming jurisdiction 
over the Xisha Islands, Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Shoal.251 Rather 
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than take territory by force, according to Mastro, “China has been moderating its policies toward 
the South China Sea in the past after recognizing that its actions escalated tensions too much.”252 
Chinese scholars have tended to advance the dubious claim that Xisha and other South China Sea 
islands have been part of China since ancient times. They often describe the huge gas and oil 
reserves a few hundred miles off Xisha shore, which account for a third of China’s total energy 
reserves, as “China’s Persian Gulf” and argue that access to these resources is necessary for 
China’s future industrial and economic development.253  
China’s military and economic interest in the South China Sea are clear but do not fully 
account for the reasons why China’s administrative hierarchy found it useful to make Sansha a 
prefecture-level city or go to such great lengths to construct buildings for civilian use. The 
primary school, for example, cost approximately USD$5.6 million to build a schoolhouse that 
can only accommodate 40 children, which comes out to $140,000 per child.254 The PRC claims 
that, not including military personnel, approximately 2,500 people live in Sansha City today.255 
Additionally, China has recently announced plans to build tourist facilities in Sansha and has 
already begun arranging cruises for patriotic Chinese tourists. The explanation that is only 
interested in expanding the reach of its military or extracting hydrocarbons in the South China 
Sea does not account for why, as Sansha City’s new mayor Xiao puts it, “The arrival of tourists 
will nourish the need for divers and windsurfers.”256 What needs would the military or offshore 
oil drilling platforms have nourished by windsurfers? 
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The last chapter considered how the Chinese territorial assemblage incorporated British 
colonial capacities into its “one country, two systems” governance arrangement with Hong Kong 
and deployed a fleet in being strategy to manage Taiwan’s autonomy in the international sphere. 
In those cases, China is reterritorializing established colonial governing practices and 
reterritorializing international institutions but, in the case of Sansha, China’s exercise of power is 
creating new territories and building new land on top of sunken atolls and coral reefs. Deleuze 
and Guattari point out that the “smooth space” of oceans presents a problem for states since “the 
task of occupying an open space with a vortical movement that can rise up at any point”257 
against “the walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures” which characterize the “striated 
space” or “grid” of territorial governance.258 Making Sansha into a prefecture-level city is more 
than just an attempt to colonize the Island or increase the legitimacy of China’s territorial claim 
over the South China Sea, though it is both of those things. China’s construction of buildings like 
a school, a barber’s shop, and a movie theater in the South China Sea show that China is also 
attending to those territorial arrangements of everyday life that interested Sack and Raffestin as 
much as the territoriality of formal international politics. There were no local elites in Sansha for 
China’s colonial administration to assimilate into government or land to accommodate even the 
six acres of the Kowloon Walled City on Yongxing Island. However, China’s control over the 
South China Sea bears a strong resemblance to the British organization of “Chinatown” on Hong 
Kong island and the PRC’s management of mainland territories by the administrative hierarchy.  
In previous chapters, I traced important moments in the development of the 
administrative hierarchy and its remarkably stable system of territorial divisions. The last chapter 
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described the administrative hierarchy incorporating the capacities of Anglo-European states 
through the Self-Strengthening movement and acquisition of Hong Kong from colonial Britain. 
However, following Sack, if we grant that the administrative hierarchy “is dynamic, that modern 
society has complex hierarchical organizations with particular characteristics which Weber calls 
bureaucratic, and that traditional societies possess traditional though often complex hierarchies 
with few modern bureaucratic characteristics, how can this be linked to territoriality?” This 
chapter begins answering that question by considering why the State Council had recently 
decided to promote or demote a province, prefecture-level city, county, or township and what 
changes for a territory when its status changes in the administrative hierarchy. Next, I trace the 
international effects of China’s decision to promote Sansha as a means of territorializing ocean 
spaces to control access to resources and surveil the nearby international shipping lanes. The 
final section of this chapter picks up the thread of tianxia cultural governance started in the last 
chapter by exploring the ways films like Zhang Yimou’s Hero (2002) attempt to destroy what 
Rey Chow calls the “Third Space” of Chinese identity between two colonizers by territorializing 
“Greater China.”259 The reform and opening up policies have done much to shift Chinese 
governance away from CCP economic planning towards PRC urban planning in the last several 
of China’s Five-Year Plans, but the administrative hierarchy has remained relatively untouched 
by the reforms. The promotion of Sansha, however, shows that the Chinese territorial assemblage 
has responded to this swing away from economic planning by developing new capacities for 
strengthening the urban disciplining power of the administrative hierarchy and expanding 
territorial control over people, capital, and volumetric spaces of international waters.  
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City-Power in the Chinese Administrative Hierarchy 
For all the changes China has undergone since the end of the Qing dynasty through the 
ROC, PRC, and the reform and opening up policies, the administrative hierarchy’s system of 
territorial divisions has proven to be the most durable capacity of the Chinese territorial 
assemblage. The lowest levels of territorial administration have been renamed from time to time 
as circuits (dao), sub-prefectures (ting), districts (qu), departments (zhou), and prefectures (fu) 
but their boundaries and placement within the administrative hierarchy have changed little since 
the Qin established them over 2,000 years ago.260 Contemporary China has replaced the Qin 
installation of a military commander, civil governor, and inspector with dual CCP and PRC 
government offices in the Civil Service at each level within the administrative hierarchy, but 
even rebels and revolutionaries have not tinkered with its division of territories into provinces, 
prefectures, counties, townships, and villages.  
These divisions are typically designed to facilitate central administration over a fixed 
territorial size or population. The province as a territorial unit, for example, is designed to 
mediate relations between the central government and the county by representing a fraction 
between 1:10 and 1:30 of China’s total population.261 The promotion and demotion of territories 
within these administrative divisions (xingzheng quhua) vary historically, are often provisional, 
and only rarely apply to all territories of the same rank. Decisions to promote or demote 
territories in the administrative hierarchy are made during conferences and negotiations between 
national level PRC and CCP members and Civil Service officials at the level of the territory in 
question. However, the final decision regarding a territory is subject to the central government 
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and its current economic development plan, its security interests or the need to consolidate the 
modern state system.262 The decision to create the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative 
Regions (not depicted in Figure 1.) at the same level as provinces and direct-controlled 
municipalities was made at the national level by the CCP General Secretary and Politburo in 
negotiation with PRC Premier of the State Council, Chairman of the National People’s Congress, 
and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Like all other changes 
to the territorial divisions, the Ministry of Civil Affairs makes an official announcement about 
the result of closed-door negotiations without advanced notice to lower-level CCP and PRC 
officers or consultation to the territory’s affected residents.  
The addition, elimination, adjustments, and merger of territorial units have almost always 
been part of a strategy designed by the state to cope with changing political and economic 
circumstances nationally or locally.263 For example, China has established hundreds of new cities 
(over 650) and has made many changes to the territorial organization of regions in the 
administrative system. The most important change was in 1997, when the Central Government 
removed the historical city of Chongqing and surrounding areas from Sichuan province and 
reclassified region, moving it from a prefectural-level up the administrative hierarchy to 
provincial-level status. Carolyn Cartier has argued that these changes are a demonstration of 
power where “Chinese space economy is an actively scaled territorial mosaic whose dialectical 
interrelations the state seeks to manage in order to spur economic development while 
simultaneously maintaining political control.”264 The creation of these hundreds of new cities and 
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regions has greatly impacted the county-level, where territory has been changed to smooth the 
progress of real estate development since only urban land can be legally leased for development. 
In 1979 there were 2009 counties, but today there are only 1464 counties in China.265 At the 
same time, many new institutions were founded at township-levels to formalize procedures in 
those areas formerly under loose regulation. A recent study has concluded that township 
bureaucracies have been growing at an annual rate of 7% since 1988.266  
The provinces and counties do not conform to geographic barriers and their boundaries 
usually result from arbitrary lines drawn by bureaucrats hundreds of years ago, making it 
difficult to study changing flows of human migration or the PRC’s territorial distribution of 
resources over long periods of time. However, the historical promotion and demotion of 
territories within the administrative hierarchy does show some of the ways the Chinese territorial 
assemblage has responded to the effects of economic development and the discovery of 
hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea. Governments at the county level, for instance, 
typically have 28 to 30 departments to govern populations between 30,000 and 1.5 million and a 
territory between 800km square and 3,000km square.267 When the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
announces that PRC and CCP officials have promoted a county to a county-level city, that does 
not necessarily mean an increase in the territory’s population, but the administrative hierarchy 
allows the existing departments to exercise more economic control over the allocation of land 
and price of materials within the territory, and creates 20 to 30 new departments for urban 
planning and construction, industrial and commercial planning, and city infrastructure 
development. If the county-level city is promoted again to the prefecture-level, the administrative 
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hierarchy creates another 10 to 20 permanent departments and substantially increases the new 
prefecture’s territory because it now also governs several district and county-level units. When 
Zhaoqing city in Guangdong province, for example, was promoted to the prefecture-level in 
1988, the administrative hierarchy expanded its territory from 748km square to 21,300km square 
and created several departments to the “new” territory, which included 10 county-level units and 
two urban districts.268 
However, the promotion or demotion of territories within the administrative hierarchy has 
developed into a new capacity for increasing bureaucratic control over China’s economy and 
disciplining CCP officials into conformity with capitalist market forces. The Chinese geographer 
Him Chung describes how the promotion of Guangzhou city, the provincial capital of 
Guangdong, has disciplined and nearly destroyed the county-level cities of Panyu and Huadu.269 
The flow of foreign investment capital into Guangzhou city following the reform and opening up 
policies of the 1980s led PRC officials to develop two “rural districts” for the city, one located in 
the center of the city focused on technology research and development and the other on the 
outskirts organized for flower and plant cultivation. The economic success of these 
developments encouraged Guangzhou’s PRC and CCP officials to begin negotiations with their 
prefectural-level and national-level counterparts for promotion within the administrative 
hierarchy. In 2000, the Panyu and Huadu counties were designated as urban districts, along with 
two new districts and a merger of two others, under Guangzhou city after its promotion to 
prefectural-level. Between 2000 and 2005, Guangzhou doubled its GDP by attracting foreign 
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investment, like new automobile factories for Toyota and Honda.270 However, as Him 
demonstrates, because Guangzhou’s prefectural promotion gave it direct control over Huadu and 
Panyu’s finances, urban planning, and industrial development, Guangzhou was able to build a 
new airport in Huadu and deep water shipping port in Panyu with relatively low resettlement and 
land costs.271 Guangzhou’s promotion also allowed its mayor, along with CCP party secretaries 
from the city and provincial levels, to requisition land occupied by indigenous villagers and 
crush Panyu’s earlier agreement to develop a cultural space for local artists to cheaply build the 
massive new Guangzhou City University.272 Zhaoqing city and Guangzhou city show the 
Chinese territorial assemblage moving to recover control over unplanned urban growth and 
conform administrative divisions more closely to economic regions. Especially in coastal and 
island cities, as Him puts it, “territory expansion is a powerful incentive to persuade local 
regimes to follow the central state’s political and economic agendas.”273 
Given these changes to the Chinese territorial assemblage, the promotion of Sansha to a 
prefecture-level city in the administrative hierarchy as a means of expanding its control over 
South China Sea territories is no a surprise. The establishment of Sansha as a prefecture-level 
city is, however, strange in that it violates the State Council’s criteria for promotion. The most 
recent amendments to the reform and opening up policies state that: 
A rural township can be designated as a city (country-level) with a minimum non- 
agricultural population of 60,000 and GDP of 200 million Yuan. Special 
treatment is given to border towns, national minority areas, famous tourist spots, 
transport hubs and ports which do not meet the above criteria. Country-level cities 
could be promoted to prefecture-level cities when: (a) nonagricultural population 
in the urban district is over 250,000, 80% of whom are situated in a city-
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government seat; (b) the gross value of industrial and agricultural output reaches 3 
billion Yuan or more, at least 80% contributed by industrial production; (c) CDP 
reaches 2.5 billion Yuan, at least 35% contributed by tertiary industry; and (d) 
local budget income is over 200 billion Yuan.274 
Sansha City meets none of the economic or population requirements of province, prefecture, 
county, or even township levels in the administrative hierarchy. According to the criteria, Sansha 
should be designated a village or, at best, a direct-controlled town if not a Special Administrative 
Region. Sansha City is also unusual because the administrative hierarchy officially expanded 
Sansha’s territory to include roughly 85% of the South China Sea without also creating new 
departments as it had with other promoted prefecture-level cities in China like Zhaoqing and 
Guangzhou or even the other two Hainan Province prefecture-level cities of Danzhou and 
Haikou. Few patriotic Chinese scholars seem troubled by this discrepancy, but many interested 
Anglo-European IR researchers and practitioners seem to be unaware of China’s territorial 
divisions and often conclude that the administrative hierarchy’s promotion of Sansha means 
China is pretending its new city is equivalent to other Anglo-European island cities such as 
Venice, Manhattan, or Honolulu.275 
 
The Tacky Territoriality of Indisputable Disputes 
Sassen has argued that the “question of territoriality has generally not been central to the 
historiography of cities” and asserts that “When it has been emphasized; the focus has typically 
been on the cities themselves, conceived of as a type of territorial organization.”276 Sansha 
provides a useful alternative for studying Chinese territoriality because it has so little territory to 
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organize. In Europe, according to Sassen, the city “wormed its way into territories” that were 
encased in jurisdictions from “feudal, ecclesiastical, and imperial” systems and produced 
“urbanized” authorities to administer the territory.277 City-building as a capacity for controlling 
territory and extending spatial mechanisms of the administrative hierarchy has been a feature of 
the Chinese territorial assemblage since the Qin dynasty. Sansha also shows that Chinese cities 
and territories are thought of differently by the administrative hierarchy than European cities. 
According to Sassen, the territoriality of European cities arose “from the ground up, which 
eventually functioned as a built-in capability for the emergent territorialities of national 
states.”278 Sansha’s territoriality, by contrast, created from the top of the administrative hierarchy 
as a strategy for extending China’s control over the islands, shipping lanes, and resources of the 
South China Sea. Having people living in that city or the buildings and institutions of other cities 
is not necessary since the administrative hierarchy creates territories as places-to-be-governed. 
Put another way, where Anglo-Europeans have tended to describe Sansha as a city with some 
territory, the Chinese administrative hierarchy sees Sansha as a territory with a city. 
Article 43 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, ratified by China and 
most other countries, designates an exclusive economic zone to countries extending 200 nautical 
miles from their coastal baselines.279 One reason China promoted Sansha is clearly an effort to 
use this convention to claim exclusive access to the huge oil reserves discovered within 200 
miles Xisha Island and monitor the flow of nearly one-third of the world’s shipping between the 
Karimata and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan.280 The territories the administrative 
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hierarchy promoted Sansha to govern includes the Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands,), Nansha 
Islands (Spratly Islands) and Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), all of which are the disputed 
territories between China and some of its Southeast Asian neighbors. Nansha has roughly 230 
maritime features such as islands, islets, and reefs.  
Vietnam currently occupies the largest twenty-seven features, the Philippines occupies 
eight features, and China occupies seven but Vietnam and China both claim to have 
“indisputable sovereignty” over all these land features. In response to China’s promotion of 
Sansha to a prefecture-level city, Vietnam filed a formal protest declared that “the city’s 
establishment and related activities are against the ground rules for resolving maritime issues the 
countries agreed to last October and the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) signed between ASEAN 
and China in 2002.”281 Zhongsha is a sunken atoll of underwater reefs and shoals, currently 
claimed by China and Taiwan. Although the U.S does not claim sovereignty over any of the 
islands in the South China Sea, Department of State officials have asserted “the freedom of 
navigation, including the security of the sea lines of communication that pass through these 
waters”282 and shown special interest and involvement to South China Sea disputes. China’s 
decision to make Sansha a city has influenced South China Sea international relations by making 
the region increasingly hostile and increasing U.S. involvement. 
China’s expansion of control over the South China Sea has not involved seizing disputed 
features from other states or forcing them to abandon their own maritime claims. Instead, 
Chinese territorial strategy has been to build up the land of existing islands it claims and creating 
new islands. In his critique of Sack and Raffestin, Anthony B. Murphy has argued that 
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researchers interested in territoriality have ignored how capacities sometimes “congeal into 
territorial projects rooted in the formalized control of space—actual or aspirational—[as] they 
come to be shaped by a long-lasting, highly sticky system that, even though relationally 
constituted, derives much of its power from the properties of the system itself.”283 In Murphy’s 
terms, the Chinese territorial assemblage is relying on the administrative hierarchy’s “sticky 
system” of territorial divisions to create artificial territories which defy conventional 
understandings of territorial waters. China’s creation of artificial territories is only just 
beginning. In late 2017, the administrative hierarchy launched the massive “magic island maker” 
dredging ship, MV Tian Kun Hao, which can dig 6,000-cubic meters per hour of sand from the 
ocean floor for future artificial territory construction.284 
Alongside this dramatic reconfiguration of the administrative hierarchy and the South 
China Sea is the subtler, but no less important, transformation of the spatial limits of Chinese 
territoriality. In 1949, the administrative hierarchy went from governing the two-dimensional 
area of land to also regulate Chinese airspace with a new institution, the General Administration 
of Civil Aviation, and the Central Military Commission. When Hong Kong was incorporated 
into the administrative hierarchy as a Special Administrative Region, the “one country, two 
systems” territorial arrangement gave Hong Kong autonomy over its skies as a “special 
domestic” airspace. However, Sansha is the first city created by the administrative hierarchy 
specifically for the purposes of controlling the three-dimensional volume of the South China 
Sea’s earth, air, and water.  
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The disputes over China’s exclusive sovereignty, the constant erosion of the artificial 
territories, and their likely submersion as global sea levels continue to rise make it impossible to 
predict whether the unusual promotion of Sansha within the administrative hierarchy will stick. 
Instead of Murphy’s “perceptually sticky spaces,”285 it is better to describe Sansha and the 
artificial territories China is building in the South China Sea as “tacky territories” since they are 
both never fully dry and a crude attempt to exploit the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. 
Advertisements for the recently announced leisure cruises by the state-owned Hainan Tourism 
International Travel Agency from Hainan Province, closed to foreigners, featuring events for 
Sansha tourists like a “national flag raising ceremony” and photo shoots for couples who want 
tropical wedding pictures on “Chinese Hawaii” also lend themselves to the description of Sansha 
as a tacky territory.286 The Chinese territorial assemblage has reconfigured the administrative 
hierarchy to produce new lands in the South China Sea and new cities, but China’s development 
of patriotic tourism also depends on what Chinese military studies scholar Peter Dutton calls “the 
projection of the cultural consciousness of the centuries-long relationship that each coastal nation 
has had with its adjoining seas”287 or, as one patriotic tourist who was recently married in Sansha 
put it, Xisha Island is a special place because “These are our lands.”288 
 
Tianxia Cultural Governance and the “Greater China” Assemblage 
Among the non-military structures recently built on Xisha Island is the Sansha Yinglong 
Cinema. The purpose of the cinema, according to its general manager, is so residents “can enjoy 
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the same exciting hot movies and feast on the same culture as people elsewhere in China.”289 In 
the last chapter, I noted how the Kowloon Walled City Park is a project of cultural governance 
which overcodes alternative encodings of official territoriality and Chinese identity, rejuvenating 
the tianxia organization of the world culturally below and geographically centered on the Central 
Plains of China. Like the Park, Sansha’s new cinema encourages residents to “feast on the same 
culture” as the rest of China with recently screened films like Feng Gao’s The War of Loong 
(2017) similarly rejuvenates tianxia by enthusiastically portrays one of the few victories the late 
Qing dynasty won against 19th-century foreign invaders.290  
In her study of China’s transition from overtly pro-Party and pro-communist propaganda 
to more subtle forms of cultural governance, Elizabeth Perry has argued that the PRC and CCP 
leaders have begun to “devote considerable attention and energy to the exercise of symbolic 
power as a means to affirm its right to rule.”291 China’s leaders are very clear to put special 
emphasis on culture and even include cultural initiatives on official political agendas. For 
example, when former Chinese President Hu Jintao made his report to the 18th National Congress 
of the Chinese Communist Party, he spent 10 minutes talking about how important it is to 
develop a strong “socialist culture” in China. He argued that “Culture is the lifeblood of a nation, 
and it gives the people a sense of belonging,” and added that “the strength and international 
competitiveness of Chinese culture are an important indicator of China’s power and prosperity 
and the renewal of the Chinese nation.”292 Later, the new Chinese President Xi Jinping continued 
this theme by recently saying “our responsibility now is to rally and lead the entire Party and the 
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people of all ethnic groups in China in taking over the relay baton passed on to us by history, and 
in making continued efforts to achieve the great renewal of the Chinese nation.”293 Occasionally, 
these propagandistic messages from the PRC leadership are more explicit. During the Occupy 
Central protests in Hong Kong, for example, the CCP-sponsored People’s Daily published an op-
ed under the pseudonym Guo Ping titled “Nobody cares about Hong Kong’s destiny more than 
all Chinese nationals” which concluded that Hong Kong could not have a revolution because 
“Hong Kong is not a country.”294 Beyond rhetoric, China’s deterritorialization of the Kowloon 
Walled City also shows that Hong Kong has become a major site of cultural governance 
initiatives which hope to solidify a shared national identity between Hongkongers and mainland 
Chinese.  
Shapiro’s work on cultural governance, specifically his attention on artistic productions 
rather than state initiatives, also provides a useful lens for considering the ways in which China 
has been encouraging “symbolic production aimed at forging homogenous national cultures.”295 
In recent decades, the Ministry of Propaganda has sponsored the production of movies, music, 
and digital media. One of the most popular of these films is Hero (2002) by the prominent 
mainland Chinese director Zhang Yimou which, at that time, was the most expensive and 
highest-grossing film in Chinese history.296 The cast, crew, and producers of Hero were overtly 
selected to bring together mainland Chinese and Hongkongese artists to symbolize the unity of 
the two territories, starring famous mainland Chinese actors Jet Li, Ziyi Zhang, and Chen 
Daoming with Hongkongese actors Tony Leung, Maggie Cheung, and Donnie Yen. The film 
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score was written by Tan Dun, the same composer who had written the major symphony for the 
Hong Kong Handover Ceremonies in 1997. Hero is set during the Warring States period and its 
plot revolves around the unification of China by the Qin Emperor. An assassin, Nameless (Jet 
Li), originally plans to kill the King of Qin (Chen Daoming) by defeating three other assassins to 
gain his trust. After presenting the three assassins’ weapons to the King and recounting how he 
defeated each, the King figures out that the nameless assassin had only defeated the three other 
assassins by convincing them to sacrifice themselves so he could get close enough to use a 
special deadly technique on the King.  
In one scene, for example, the assassin Broken Sword (Tony Leung) decides to sacrifice 
himself for Nameless’ plan after being confronted about not killing the King when he had the 
chance three years earlier. Broken Sword responds by using his weapon to draw “天下,” the 
characters for tianxia, in the sand signaling his desire for a unified and peaceful state. After 
hearing this story, the King no longer fears the assassin and tosses his own sword to Nameless. 
Instead of killing the King, Nameless is converted from enemy to friend and realizes that 
individuals must sometimes sacrifice themselves for their kingdom and the greater good. The 
King understands that unifying the nation requires him to enforce the law, and so he reluctantly 
orders Nameless to be executed, but the film ends with Nameless receiving a hero’s funeral. 
Some critics have argued that “the ulterior meaning of the film was the triumph of security and 
stability over liberty analogous to the ‘Asian Values’ concept that gained brief popularity in the 
1990s”297 while others likened Zhang and Hero to Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film 
Triumph of the Will (1965).298 However, there is a strong resonance between Hero’s final scene 
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and the patriotic tourists married in Sansha. The closing text of Hero explains that “The King of 
Qin went on to conquer all six Kingdoms and unite the country…This was more than two 
thousand years ago. But even now when the Chinese speak of their country they call it Our 
Land.”299 By making a popular film with famous actors from both Hong Kong and China, 
conflating the alternative meanings of tianxia as “all under heaven” and “the world” with “our 
land,” Hero encourages people on the mainland, Hong Kong, the disputed territories, and 
Chinese diaspora communities to think of themselves as members of the nation the Qin Emperor 
founded and “Greater China” (Dazhongguo). 
This chapter began with an analysis of how the Chinese territorial assemblage’s 
capacities of territorial division have been reconfigured by the administrative hierarchy as new 
capacities for increasing bureaucratic management of China’s economy and disciplining 
territories into conformity with the central government’s current economic development plan or 
security interests. I then described how the decision to promote Sansha to a prefecture-level city 
in the administrative hierarchy does not conform to the criteria of a city in Chinese and Anglo-
European terms but is an effort by China to territorialize the South China Sea and control access 
to its resources. I labeled Sansha a “tacky territory” because of its continual incompleteness as 
China continues to build it up with sand dredged from the ocean floor and its simultaneous 
erosion by force of the South China Sea’s water flows, and for China’s crude attempt to use 
international legal conventions to claim ownership over the region as Chinese territorial waters. 
Finally, I argued that China’s building of the Sansha Yinglong Cinema and sponsorship of films 
like Hero contribute new capacities of cultural governance to the Chinese territorial assemblage.  
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The capacity of cultural products like films and tourism to hold the mainland, Hong 
Kong, and Sansha together as members of Greater China. Tianxia cultural governance also gives 
China new capacities for managing territories that are far beyond the territorial divisions of the 
administrative hierarchy. As the Chinese economy continues to grow and the U.S. economy 
continues to be hobbled by the 2008 financial crash, Chinese companies have been buying 
Hollywood production companies, studios, and theaters. For example, the Chinese real estate and 
entertainment conglomerate Dalian Wanda Group recently bought Legendary Entertainment 
studio, and the American theater chain AMC Entertainment and Europe’s largest theater 
company Odeon & UCI. Hunan Television, the PRC-owned broadcaster from Mao’s home 
province, has made massive investments in the Lionsgate Entertainment Corporation.300 
Chinese companies have been especially interested in supporting science fiction films 
where China can play a prominent role in the future. China’s biggest e-commerce platform and 
gaming company, Alibaba and Trencent, provided the funding for popular franchises like the 
latest Mission: Impossible and Star Trek films. The effects of tianxia cultural governance can be 
seen in directing and casting decisions, as well as in the content of these artistic and popular 
productions. Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (2016) was directed and starred by Jiang Wen along 
with Hero’s Donnie Yen.301 After Simon Pegg received funding for his Star Trek: Beyond (2016) 
script from Huahua Media and Alibaba Pictures, the producers hired Taiwanese director Justin 
Lin for the film.302 When Matt Damon’s character is stranded on Mars in Ridley Scott’s The 
Martian (2015), he was saved only after NASA failed and the China National Space 
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Administration took over organizing his rescue mission.303 In Zhejiang province, the Hengdian 
World Studios built the world’s largest outdoor film studio and has a larger budget and daily 
shooting capacity than Paramount and Universal studios combined.304 The name of the studio 
varies between “Chinawood” for Anglo-European media305 and the “Great Heng Kingdom” in 
China,306 but the head of the Hengdian Group unambiguously declares that the goal of China’s 
increasing investments in the global film industry is to “sell Chinese culture to the world.”307 
China may never incorporate Taiwan as its 23rd province or successfully control the South China 
Sea with artificial islands, but tianxia cultural governance film projects have only begun to 
reassemble mainlanders, Hongkongese, Taiwanese, and other diaspora communities into a 
Greater China. 
 
References 
Barki, Deniz, and John Rogers, eds. Review of Maritime Transport 2015. New York; Geneve: 
United Nations, 2015. 
Cartier, Carolyn. “City-Space: Scale Relations and China’s Spatial Administrative Hierarchy.” In 
Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space, edited by Fulong 
Wu and Laurence J. C. Ma. Taylor & Francis, 2004. 
———. “The Territorial City,” July 3, 2013. http://www.thechinastory.org/2013/07/the-
territorial-city/. 
Chen, Shengyong, and Bingxuan Zhang. “建国60年来中国地方行政区划和府际关系的变革和
展望 (Changes and Prospects of China Administrative Division and Relationships 
between Levels of Government over the Past 60 Years).” 浙江工商大学校刊 (Journal of 
Zhengjiang Gongshang University), no. 5 (2009): 5–15. 
Cheng, Yuanyuan. “探秘中国领土最南端地级市三沙：面积最大人口最少 (Explore Sansha: 
The Southernmost and Smallest Prefecture-Level City in China with the Largest 
Population).” Beijing News, January 8, 2017. http://www.chinanews.com/m/sh/2017/01-
08/8117005.shtml. 
                                                     
303 Scott, The Martian. 
304 Yang, “中国好莱坞：横店影视城 (China’s Hollywood: Hengdian Movie City).” 
305 Montefiore, “Is ‘Chinawood’ the New Hollywood?” 
306 Sun, “Dream Factory.” 
307 Xu, “Dongyang Municipal People’s Political Consultative Conference of the Federation of Industry and 
Commerce and the ‘Introduction of Hengdian Urban Integration Engine.’” 
125 
 
China Industrial Map Editorial Committee, ed. (中国产业地图：汽车2004-2005) China 
Industrial Map: Automobiles 2004-2005. 北京 (Beijing): 北京社会科学文献出版社 
(Beijing Social Scientific Literature Publishing), 2005. 
“China’s Sansha City Starts Building First School.” Accessed July 7, 2014. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/14/c_133407640.htm. 
Chow, Rey. “Between Colonizers: Hong Kong’s Postcolonial Self-Writing in the 1990s.” 
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 2, no. 2 (1992): 151–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1992.0011. 
Chung, Him. “State Regulation and China’s Administrative System: A Spatial Perspective.” 
China Review 8, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 201–30. 
Cronin, Patrick M. Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China 
Sea. Center for a New American Security, 2012. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. 
Dutton, Peter. “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea.” Naval 
War College Review 64, no. 4 (2011): 42–67. 
Ebert, Roger. “Hero,” August 27, 2004. 
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040826/REVIEWS/408260
304/1023. 
Edwards, Gareth. Rogue One: A Star Wars Story, 2016. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3748528/. 
Fitzgerald, John, ed. Rethinking China’s Provinces. London; New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Gao, Feng. The War of Loong, 2017. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt7345928/. 
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “New Satellite Images Show Reinforced Chinese Surface-to-Air Missile 
Sites near Disputed Islands.” Washington Post, February 23, 2017, sec. Checkpoint. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/23/new-satellite-images-
show-reinforced-chinese-surface-to-air-missile-sites-near-disputed-islands/. 
Hainan Tourism International Travel Agency. “海南西沙五天游专线 (Hainan Xisha Five Day 
Tour Line).” Accessed April 15, 2018. http://m.cncn.com/lxs/78964/t277999. 
Hamedy, Saba. “Lionsgate Finalizes Deal with China’s Hunan TV.” Los Angeles Times, March 
12, 2015. http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-lionsgate-
hunan-tv-funding-deal-20150312-story.html. 
He, Guoqiang. 当代中国的地方政府 (Local Governments in Contemporary China). 广东 
(Guangdong): 广东高等教育出版社 (Guangdong Higher Education Publishing House), 
1994. 
Hoberman, J. “Man With No Name Tells a Story of Heroics, Color Coordination.” The Village 
Voice, August 17, 2004. https://www.villagevoice.com/2004/08/17/man-with-no-name-
tells-a-story-of-heroics-color-coordination/. 
Huang, Jingwen, trans. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress.” The People’s 
Daily Online, November 19, 2012. http://en.people.cn/90785/8024777.html. 
Huang, Yufan, and Jane Perlez. “中国在南海争议岛礁开发旅游业 (China Develops Tourism 
on the Disputed Island Reef in the South China Sea).” The New York Times Chinese 
Website, May 30, 2016. https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20160530/c30chinasea/. 
Ji, Jinghong. “创造三沙奇迹 三沙市成立筹备工作纪实 (Creating the Sansha Miracle: 
Documenting the Establishment of Sansha City).” Xinhua News Agency, August 2, 2012. 
The Internet Archive. 
126 
 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121006121956/http://www.hq.xinhuanet.com/sansha/2012
-08/02/c_112598105.htm. 
Li, Xiaokun, and Xiaoli Liu. “Sansha Seeks to Become Major Tourist Attraction.” China Daily, 
May 27, 2016. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-05/27/content_25488606.htm. 
Lin, Justin. Star Trek: Beyond, 2016. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2660888/. 
Ma, Laurence J. C. “Urban Administrative Restructuring, Changing Scale Relations and Local 
Economic Development in China.” Political Geography 24, no. 4 (May 2005): 477–97. 
Mao, Zhenhua. “国之重器‘天鲲号’下水 中国制造再添羽翼 (The Launch of Tian Kun Hao Is 
a New Win for Products Made in China).” Xinhua News Agency, November 7, 2017. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-11/07/c_1121918504.htm. 
Mastro, Oriana. “The Sansha Garrison: China’s Deliberate Escalation in the South China Sea.” 
Accessed January 4, 2015. http://www.cnas.org/content/bulletin-5-sansha-garrison-
china%E2%80%99s-deliberate-escalation-south-china-sea. 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Reprint edition. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2003. 
Montefiore, Clarissa Sebag. “Is ‘Chinawood’ the New Hollywood?” British Broadcasting 
Corporation, October 10, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20140207-is-
chinawood-the-new-hollywood. 
Murphy, Alexander B. “Entente Territorial: Sack and Raffestin on Territoriality.” Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 30, no. 1 (2012): 159 – 172. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/d4911. 
“National Data.” National Bureau of Statistics of China. Accessed April 12, 2018. 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01. 
“Overview of Chinese Administrative Systems.” Local Authorities for International Relations 
Forum. Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan, June 2000. 
http://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/international/spw/general/china/index_e.html. 
Perry, Elizabeth J. “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘Re-Orienting’ Party 
Propaganda.” Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Papers, Harvard, 2013. 
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/11386987. 
Ping, Guo. “没有人比全体中国人更关心香港的前途命运 (Nobody Cares about Hong Kong’s 
Destiny More than All Chinese Nationals).” The People’s Daily, September 29, 2014. 
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0929/c1003-25761887.html. 
Riefenstahl, Leni. Triumph of the Will, 1935. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0025913/. 
Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton; 
Ewing: Princeton University Press California Princeton Fulfillment Services 
[Distributor], 2008. 
Scott, Ridley. The Martian, 2015. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3659388/. 
Shapiro, Michael J. Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject. 
New edition. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
“State Council Approving and Forwarding the Report on Adjustment of the Criteria of 
Designated City by Ministry of Civil Affairs.” State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, 1993. https://wenku.baidu.com/view/b6937a6025c52cc58bd6befd?pcf=2. 
Sun, Jiahui. “Dream Factory.” China Daily Europe, December 8, 2017. 
https://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-12/08/content_35256681.htm. 
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (n.d.). 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
127 
 
“Vietnam Continues to Protest China’s Establishment of Island City.” Thanh Nien Daily. 
Accessed August 13, 2014. http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-continues-
to-protest-chinas-establishment-of-island-city-6142.html. 
“Xi Jinping’s Remarks to the Press.” Accessed December 31, 2014. 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27130032.htm. 
Xu, Wenrong. “Dongyang Municipal People’s Political Consultative Conference of the 
Federation of Industry and Commerce and the ‘Introduction of Hengdian Urban 
Integration Engine.’” Hengdian Group, February 23, 2017. 
http://www.hengdian.com/newsdot_8385.html. 
Yang, Bing Xin. “中国好莱坞：横店影视城 (China’s Hollywood: Hengdian Movie City).” 凤
凰网 (Fenghuang Financial News), December 16, 2011. 
http://finance.ifeng.com/news/corporate/20111216/5283868.shtml. 
Yang, Dali L. Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change 
Since the Great Leap Famine. Stanford: Stanford Univ Press, 1998. 
Yang, Guang. “论中国在南海问题上的国家利益 (On China’s National Interests in the South 
China Sea Dispute).” 新东方 (New Oriental) 46 (2012): 10–16. 
Yunna, Zheng. “我国最南端电影院三沙市银龙电影院首映 (Movie Theater Premier in Sansha 
City, China’s Southernmost Cinema).” Xinhua News Agency, July 22, 2017. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-07/22/c_129661431.htm. 
Zhang, Yimou. Hero. Action, Adventure, Drama, 2004. 
Zhaoqing Gazetteer Editorial Committee. 肇庆市志 (Zhaoqing City Gazetteer). 广东 
(Guangdong): 广东人民出版社 (People’s Publishing House), 1999. 
 
  
128 
 
Conclusion: 
 
“China” 
 
 
It is the shared aspiration of all Chinese people and in the fundamental interests of 
the Chinese nation to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and 
realize China’s complete reunification. In front of the great national interests and 
the tide of history, any actions and tricks to split China are doomed to fail. They 
are certain to meet with the people’s condemnation and the punishment by 
history. The Chinese people have the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to 
defeat secessionist attempts in any form! The Chinese people and the Chinese 
nation share a common belief that it is never allowed and it is absolutely 
impossible to separate any inch of territory of our great country from China! 
―President Xi’s Reelection Speech, March 2018308 
 
 
The effort of this dissertation was to examine the development of Chinese territoriality in 
ancient and modern times, and reconfigurations of Chinese territoriality following the reform and 
opening up era of the 1980s to the present. An organizing theme in the Chinese and Anglo-
European IR literature has been that China is undergoing epochal economic and imperialist 
transformations which signal either a “peaceful rise”309 or a “new hegemony.”310 Patriotic 
Chinese scholars and critical Anglo-European IR researchers trace these transformations through 
the official CCP slogans of PRC leaders from Deng Xiaoping's “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” and Jiang Zemin’s “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” to Hu Jintao’s 
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“harmonious society” and Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” or most recently “One Belt, One Road.” 
China is indeed becoming more economically powerful and increasingly imperialistic, but if the 
changes to China are foundational, these two processes and the PRC slogans only capture part of 
the transformation. As the most formalized institution of Chinese territorialization, the 
administrative hierarchy is undergoing radical changes in its critical components of territorial 
governance. A critical understanding of changes to Chinese territoriality must contend with the 
complexities of local identities, capacities of governance, and institutionalization of the 
administrative hierarchy as the units around which so much territoriality has been organized over 
several centuries. The Chinese state has been a major site of transformation, even when it seems 
to be a rigidly constructed authoritarian monolith and contradicts its commitment to Marxist-
Leninist communism.  
I began this project with a critique of the strong vs. weak categorizations of state power 
which have become their own kind of organizing logics for IR researchers and practitioners. 
Throughout this project, I have argued that we cannot understand Chinese territoriality by 
confining our study to the stated intentions of political leaders without concluding, as Tok does, 
that territorial disputes are simply patriotic assertions of China’s right of naming.311 Similarly, 
searching for evidence that policies have resulted in their stated objectives leads too many 
researchers like Preston into normative judgments over the success or failure of “one country, 
two systems”312 without considering how specific “failure” might succeed in preventing Hong 
Kong’s domestic independence and restrict Taiwan’s international autonomy. Instead, the goal of 
                                                     
311 Sow Keat Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan, Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 172. 
312 Peter W. Preston, The Politics of China-Hong Kong Relations: Living With Distant Masters (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016). 
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this project was to apply assemblage thinking to describe China’s past and current expressions of 
territoriality and indicate where China sees its future place in the world. 
This dissertation is shot through with history, but it is not a history of the Chinese state. 
My analytic inroads are made into specific events when established configurations of Chinese 
territoriality were disturbed. Sometimes these events directly involved the formal mechanisms of 
state governance, like the PRC’s requisitioning of administrative hierarchy capacities to promote 
territories as a means of territorializing the South China Sea. At other times, these events 
included the complex interactions between states such as the development of tributary 
relationships to reinforce tianxia territoriality or the collaboration with British colonial 
administrators to demolish the Kowloon Walled City. Other changes to Chinese territoriality 
might involve state representatives but were conditioned by accidents. The most notable example 
here is the mistranslation of “Crown Leases” as “New Territories” during the meeting between 
MacLehose and Deng as the trigger for China’s reterritorialization of Hong Kong. The result is a 
series of detailed excavations of a few historical moments which are critical in revealing the 
processes by which Chinese territoriality gets assembled and then partly disassembled. 
Exploring current transformations of Chinese territoriality through the lens of assemblage 
thinking allowed me to avoid privileging the new and undeniable rise of China as a global 
economic and political force. Even new arrangements that are an extreme instance of a novel 
territorial assemblage like the production of artificial island territories in the South China Sea 
described in Chapter 3 depend on recently invented dredging technologies and capacities derived 
partly from older assemblages like the territorial divisions of the Qin dynasty. Similarly, China’s 
construction of coastal infrastructure for countries like Sri Lanka depends on capacities 
developed by Guangzhou to build the deep-water port in Panyu. While China’s capacities to 
131 
 
make loans like the USD$1.3billion it gave to Sri Lanka for the project is new, forcing Sri Lanka 
to sign a 99-year lease for its southern port of Hambantota shows how far some of the British 
colonial capacities for controlling the New Territories have been incorporated into the Chinese 
territorial assemblage.313  
The chapters of this dissertation are primarily concerning with the ways China has proven 
to be a remarkably durable and flexible assemblage. However, because China operates as an 
assemblage, its control over territories is never complete and often generates resistance. Social 
and geographical resistance to the Chinese territorial assemblage can be as simple as former 
residents defying China’s attempt to erase the alternative community of the Kowloon Walled 
City by meeting at the Park that replaced it and offering visitors what Shapiro calls a “counter-
script” to the PRC’s narrative of Hong Kong’s “return” to Greater China.314 In other cases, 
China’s management of its territorial assemblages has condition the possibility for desperate 
forces and institutions to congeal into new counter-assemblages. After Hong Kong residents 
began feeling the effects of the 2008 U.S. economic collapse, residents organized their 
opposition to global finance and neoliberal governance using anti-imperial strategies developed 
earlier against British rule. However, where earlier movements like the 1925 Guangzhou–Hong 
Kong general strike discussed in Chapter 2 involved boycotting British goods and companies, 
these new protests also incorporated capacities for resisting global finance and neoliberal 
governance.  
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Aided by new social media and mobile phone technologies, protestors assembled the 
“leaderless” and “horizontal” organizations of Occupy Wall Street protests, the Green Movement 
in Iran, and Sunflower Student Movement in Taiwan into the 2011 “Occupy Central” protests. 
The High Court finally issued an injunction against the protestors and police eventually cleared 
the protestor encampments but Occupy Central became one of the lengthiest Occupy movements 
in the world.315 Then, in 2014, the CCP proposed reforming the Hong Kong’s electoral system by 
forming a nominating committee to replace the 1200-member Election Committee set out by the 
Basic Law. The reform would effectively allow the CCP to pre-select two or three candidates for 
Chief Executive before the election and give Beijing additional confirmation powers over the 
election results.316 Activists reassembled most of the horizontal organizational and democratic 
capacities of Occupy Central, except this time Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Alex Chow served as 
nominal leaders and spokespersons for the movement. Participants also employed umbrellas to 
shield themselves from the tear gas and pepper spray police had used to disperse the crowd 
outside the HSBC headquarters two years earlier. The incorporation of umbrellas made the anti-
Chinese territorial assemblage more resilient, but the movement fell apart after Wong, Law, 
Chow and other leaders were finally arrested by the Hong Kong police.317 China was eventually 
able to dissolve the anti-PRC Occupy movements in 2011 and 2014. However, given the 
continuing economic and political unrest in Hong Kong, combined with the ability of organizers 
to quickly reassemble these capacities of resistance, it should not be surprising to find a new, 
perhaps even larger and durable, Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong soon. 
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In addition to social movements, several territories have also been organized to resist 
Chinese territoriality. James Scott has detailed the methods peoples living in the high altitudes of 
Yunan, Guizhou, Guanxi, and Sichuan provinces, in addition to the Central Highlands of 
Vietnam and northeastern India, have used to resist incorporation into states in general, and the 
Chinese state in particular.318 Scott recounts strategies such as farmers resisting the tax collector 
by growing potatoes as opposed to rice or wheat so that any visiting state official interested in 
assessing or collecting a portion of farm yields would have to dig up the produce themselves. 
Scott also considered peoples choosing to live in, or actively terraform, territories that are 
difficult for states to govern including “low, wet places—marshes, swamps, fens, bogs, moors, 
deltas, mangrove coasts, and complex waterways and archipelagoes…as [well as] high mountain 
redoubts.”319  
This dissertation project has described Chinese territoriality as an assemblage in part to 
escape the state-centric approaches to international relations, but future research projects might 
also apply assemblage thinking methods to expand upon Scott’s analysis of these “state-resistant 
topographies” in China. Future research projects could similarly take my approach to assemblage 
thinking and uncover how the tianxia, tributary, colonial, and cultural governance capacities I 
have isolated in this study contribute to China’s territorial arrangements with the mainland 
autonomous regions. My study of the ways China has incorporated British methods like 
collaborating with local Hong Kong elites or China’s deterritorialization of Taiwan with a fleet in 
being strategy has only scratched the surface of the colonial and prophylactic independence 
capacities China has developed to manage Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, and 
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Ningxia. This project’s analysis of Chinese and British collaboration to replace the Kowloon 
Walled City with a Yangtze-style Qing garden and increasing influence over the global film 
industry as an emerging capacity of tianxia cultural governance could also be used to make sense 
of China’s massive $8 trillion “One Belt and One Road Initiative” to revive the ancient Silk 
Road.320 Isolating the powerful capabilities present in large-scale national and geopolitical 
movements, as this dissertation has done, makes it possible for IR scholars to capture the unseen 
work and abstract processes assembling a heterogeneous array of territories into “China.” 
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